Why did our army know about failures? Why is the SRSR tolerant of failure on the cob of the great war? Strategic forerunners of the command of the Chervonoy Army. Causes of the first radian failures in the Great Vitchiznyanіy war. Dovіdka Why the red army of ter

About the cob period of the Great Vytchiznyanoi war hundreds, thousands of books, articles have been written, films have been made, and “copies” have been slandered from different super girls. But all the same, there is food - how so? Why is the Chervona Army straining, as small as it was in the remaining two decades, more tanks, litakiv, could not stand on their cordons and allowed the enemy to break through to Leningrad, Moscow, the Volga?

The anti-Stalinists have a simple idea: they talk, the Stalinist regime is guilty of everything - having the best commanders, believing Hitler, not believing the rise, filthy preparing the army too thin. Ale archival documents and the rest of the records of Russian authors (for example, you can read the series “War and mi”) to talk about the difference: there were no exact data of the investigation, it was impersonal to supersede one to one information; the army, the economy, and the suspense were prepared until the war in a fair way (without indulgences). The “cleansing” of the officer corps did not worsen the combativeness of the country’s officer corps, but rather increased, repressed the prisoners, and suffocated the p’yanitsa; right military leaders began to come to the fore, what they went through fighting school- From a simple soldier to the commander of a division, corps. About tse, for example, you can read in the book of Igor Pikhalov "Great Fooled War."

In the gallery of diplomacy of the SRSR, having also shown itself from the shortest side, having gained a low victory on the diplomatic (early political) front: the food was taken away from the security of Leningrad, the cordonies were signifi- cantly sent to the rear, turned low on their territory, played an hour for preparation. At the military age of Chervona, the Army won the last battles in Spain, in Khasan, Halkin-Gol, in China, in Poland, in the war in Finland, without respect for all the hardness of the whole, but without such a “school” you can’t learn to fight.

The writer Yuriy Mukhin, having hung up the version, conceded that one of the main factors affecting the cob period of warfare was the so-called “problem of the war camp”. Only the Chervonoy Army is not sick, this problem originated in Russian Empire, passing from recessions to SRSR, and then to Russian Federation. The essence of the її axis of why: after that, as the nobles took away the possibility not to serve, but to serve in the city of the officer, the officer corps of the empire began to virojuvatisya. Before that, commanders started their service from the bottom (thus, Peter the Great zmushuvav serving the children of the aristocracy from soldiers and sailors), to that Suvorov, Kutuzov and were "fathers" to their soldiers. The stinks knew their psychology thoroughly, or with them, slept with them, stood in the same ranks, “they didn’t bow to the stows”, stinks were an unparalleled authority for the soldiers, they were loved, they believed in them and were ready to vikonate be-like a task. After the liquidation of the system, the officers became a mass of ill-informed people, often attending and caring. For them, the army was a place of "warm", high-status life, a place of kar'jeri. This became one of the main reasons for the blows in the Crimean war, if behind the bright glare and show-off, zhahlivy vadis broke out, if the right heroes (such as Kornilov, Nakhimov, Istomin, hundreds of thousands of officers and blocs did not allow catastrophic failures) perished, Empire This was the cause of the Russian-Turkish war, which thrived, 1877-1878 years, strikes in the Russian-Japanese 1904-1905 years, failures at Persh holy war. I became the cause of catastrophic failures at the Great Vitchiznian War. The main reasons Mukhin is called are incompetence, fearfulness, lack of will, unprofessionalism of the highest command warehouse. I navit direct zrada. So, on the thought of Yuri Mukhin, the command of the Zahidny Viysk district (front) - Pavlov and K., they simply allowed the lack of power to stand on the Central strategic direct line. Opened the road to Smolensk and Moscow.

Yuri Mukhin

Otherwise, it is important to explain why the cordoners were not ready before the strike, the Baltic and Black Sea fleets were at combat readiness, the Kiev military district was vitrim to strike and launch counterattacks, and in Belarus there was a catastrophe.

But, perhaps, the main reason for the catastrophe of the cob period is the tightness of the blow. Yogo did not see the future of the armies that were running at that time. To strike such a blow, it was necessary for the Chervonoy Army to strike in 1944-1945. People, including a significant part of the commanders, not a little psychological readiness to die, but to come out. Chastina (must know the heroic butt Brest Fortress, and there were few such stocks) were vithrimali and fought to the last death. And most, especially there, where there were no passions (Russian baked, spovnenih life force), building breaths and suffocated on a mortal battle, stepped in and were given in full. To follow the lead in full columns made everything clear - if you don’t meet people, if you want to attack an innumerable convoy, you just go to the massacre.

Tse confirm and equal the victory of the Wehrmacht on the head straights to strike - 3-x-5-fold advantage in manpower and technology.

Even more important are those who soldiers of the Wehrmacht were already a fighting army, but not peaceful (like the greater Chervonoi Army), the stench already "tasted blood" from Poland, Norway, France, Yugoslavia, Greece. The stench is small psychological readiness to drive in, were absolutely convinced of their rightness- it’s even more important in battle, be absolutely inspired by your strength. Well, the stink of the naivishcha race, and against them "non-human orcs", the program worked.

All of a sudden, the situation changed, the Russians lost their family memory, the stench became Warriors again. The Russian people, Russia cannot be overcome from their territory, in the open battle, the Russian Spirit has spread, and all the false programs of the Nazis have not seen it hit.

Dzherela:
Great Obov'yazana war - 2. For the hardened ed. A. Dyukov. M., 2008.
Isaev A. Antisuvoriv. Ten myths of another world war. M. 2006.
Lebedintsiv A.Z., Mukhin Yu.I. Fathers-commanders. M., 2004.
Mukhin Y. Yakby are not generals! I will become a military problem. - M., 2006.
Mukhin Yu.I. Crossroads on Skhid - M., 2004.
Pikhalov I. Great swamp war. M, 2006.
The human factor. For zag. ed. Yu. I. Mukhina. M., 2003.

Reporting paragraph § 26-27 from history for students of class 11, authors Danilov D.D., Petrovich V.G., Bєlichenko D.Yu., Selinov P.I., Antonov V.M., Kuznetsov A.V. Basic and burial date 2016

SECURITY MATERIAL

Dots of dawn diverge one by one at the offensive: cause a blow to the Red Army

Formulate the problem and compare your version with the authors' version.

What caused the defeat of the Red Army on the cob of the Great Great Vіtchiznyanoї war?

REPEAT THE NECESSARY KNOWLEDGE

Resurrect the main reasons that brought humanity to the beginning of a global conflict like the 1930s.

Versailles-Washington system of international tickets

The economic crisis has spurred the radicalization (suspension of hard cardinal approaches) of rich political regimes

Aggressive plans and nedovіra one to one between " backward democracies”, fascist dictatorships and the communist Radyansky Union.

Uninterrupted podії, scho called before the war:

1936 entry of German troops near the Rhine demilitarized zone

Agreement on the union of Germany and Italy (All Berlin-Rome); "Anti-Cominternship Pact" of Nіmechchini and Japan

1937 - the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war (1937–1945).

1938 - victory of Frank's fascists in the Great War in Spain.

Admission ("Anschluss") of Austria to Nimechchin.

summer - the power of Nimechchin to Czechoslovakia to transfer the cordon territories inhabited by the Germans.

Veresen - Munich favor of England, France and Germany about the transfer of the remaining part of Czechoslovakia. The SRSR is ready to invade Czechoslovakia, but Poland does not let the troops through its territory. Czechoslovaks allow the Germans to pay off the cordon regions.

10 birch - Stalin, in the wake of the CPSU (b), calls England and France at the provocation of the war, it seems that the SRSR is ready to "pursue and attack the policy of the world and strike business links with the usma lands." Ribbentrop at Nіmechchinі accepts as requested before negotiations.

15 birch - occupation of all Czechoslovakia by the Nazis (destruction of the Munich lands without the reaction of England and France).

21 birch - Nіmechchina vіd Poland hand over the lands inhabited by nіmtsy, that “carry out a joint anti-radian policy”.

May 17-22 - the beginning of the Radyansk-Japanese slaughter conflict on the river. Khalkhin-Gol near Mongolia (until serp 1939)

September 23 - signing of the Radian-Nimets pact on non-aggression (Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) and secret protocols about the division of spheres in Europe.

Name the firebrands when preparing the SRSR before entering the war in 1939–1941.

Modernization of the army

Industrialization of the economy

Visnovok to the Non-Aggression Pact of the USSR and Nіmechchini

Admission of the territory of Belarus, the Baltic States, Poland with the method of entry of the Western cordons of the SRSR.

Large-scale redeployment of the military to the western cordons

1. Before grass-worm 1941 p. on the cordons of the Soviet Socialist Republic, the fascist Nіmechchina for help allies (Italy, Ugorshchina, Rumunії, Finland) was in the middle of 190 divisions - 5.5 million soldiers and officers. The Soviet Socialist Republic had 170 divisions - 2.9 million soldiers. Ale acted to the Germans on strategic lines with manpower mayzhe 2 times, the divisions of the Chervonoy army significantly outweighed the invading army from the number of tanks and aircraft, did not give up artillery, security of military equipment.

2. The peculiarities of the administrative-command system with a totalitarian basis at that time was a zhorstka pyramidal structure. Otherwise, hanging on, all the long-term solutions were accepted by one person - I.V. Stalinim. For a long time, having not reacted to the super-clear intelligence reports, vvazhayuchi English disinformation and provocations of the German generals. For the widest version, which explains such a behavior, Stalin had any way to break the cob of military deeds.

3. Lesser at the red 1941 p. at the Radyansky kerіvnitstvі (usampered, at the vіyskomu) realized that the attack of Nіmechchini was imminent. Under the supervision of the military selections, the prizes were awarded to the army of reservists (trained earlier soldiers). There was a large-scale redeployment of the troops to the western cordons. On the 21st of the evening of the month, a directive was issued on bringing a special warehouse of supplies to combat readiness and the possibility of provocations from the German side. But not all the military parts were far away from getting this directive: the German saboteurs planted Brandenburg-800, dressed up in a military uniform, penetrated the territory of the military towns, cut the telephone lines. Early vranci 22 chervnya 1941 avianalyt appeared at the frontier places, Ukrainian regions, objects of communication.

4. The German invasion found a lot of radian military parts of the znenatska; in the first days, the control of the parts was destroyed, the links between them, the supply of ammunition, and the fingers were thin. The wedding was saved as a male support, and panics, ruined commanders and soldiers. Super-clear punishments thwarted tanks and motorized rifle divisions to carry out vicious marches. Came into injustice and the technique, which died out, was simply thrown, in certain parts up to 80% of the losses were non-combatant. In the first days of the battles, the Germans were far away from taking care of the outside panuvannya at the window.

5. The commanders of the Middle Lanka acted unsympathetically and without initiative, trying with all their might not to take the blame; The mass building in full became the norm (the German command spoke about more than 3 million soldiers in 1941).

Growing visnovok: why, at the cob stage of the war (1941–1942), did the SRSR recognize terrible blows and recognize great losses?

Висновок: на початковому етапі війни (1941-1942 рр.) СРСР зазнав страшних поразок і зазнав величезних втрат тому, що керівництво країни не вірило в напад Німеччини, німецька армія мала чисельну перевагу, напад застав прикордонні війська зненацька, недосвідченість і непрофесіоналізм офіцерського армії, movchannya until the 3rd lime of Stalin, which was the punishment for smut. Prote fascist Nimechchini did not go into the plan of the bliskavich war, the radiant society saved it and increased the possibilities for support.

Analyze Podії 1942 p. and to grow whiskers: why did the SRSR recognize terrible blows and recognize great expenses at the cob stage of the war (1941–1942)?

PROFILE MATERIAL

Analyze the texts of dzherel ta on their basis, create visnovok about the causes of failures radyansky viysk at the cob period of war.

F. Halder, chief of the German General Staff: ... About the complete failure of our offensive for the enemy, to note the fact that the parts of the enemy were buried in the barracks, the airmen stood at the airfields, covered with tarpaulin, and the forward units, rapt attacked by our troops, incited the command , what їm work.

Order of a member of the Viyskovoi army for the sake of the 16th army: ... I can give you information about those who are entrusted to you by military service divisions, who display negative moods, show fearfulness and drunkenness.

... The Russian soldier will overthrow our adversary at the Sunset with his anger to death. Vitrimka and fanaticism terrify yogo trimatisya doti, the docks of wine are not driven into the trenches, or do not fall dead at the hand-to-hand essence.

.... Even if (the Germans) will still create an alternative Russian order, a lot of Russians can believe in those that the Germans are right to fight only against the Belarusian system, and not against Russia. It is possible, like me, to think other generals; I can see some of them who don't like communism anymore; but stinks today can’t do anything else, how to support yoga.

Major General K.D. Golubev. Report of the Commander of the 43rd Army I.V. Stalin. 8 leaf fall 1941

This document is about the presence of differences and the struggle for leadership among the middle of the highest army of the army, which is also the cause of the blows and losses.

Tell veterans M. Makarenka about the battles for Moscow and V.V. Karpova about battles born in 1942, N.M. Yaganova.

This document is about the masculinity and heroism of ordinary soldiers.

Tsey order of the names "Not a little back!", Posiluvav discipline in the Red Army, zaboravy vіdhіd vіysk without punishment, introducing penal roti and battalions, as well as barricading paddocks. Vision after the defeat of the Chervonoy army under Kharkiv (Kharkiv cauldron, 1942). In classical historiography, it is customary to take into account that every order is necessary for the situation, but also the cause of great expenses.

V.A. Nevezhin, Russian historian, about different versions of the cob of the Great Vitchiznyan war.

Irrespective of the obvious differences between the participants in the controversy about the assessment of the activity of I.V. Stalin's preparations for the slaughter of Nimechchina ahead of the day on 22 chervnya 1941. This controversy has shown this. Stalin and radyansk kerіvnitstvo, no doubt, little vlasny "scenario" of the future war. The stench showed their own war like a culture, offensive.

P.M. Bobilov about the cob of the Great Veteran War.

... The basis of the grassroots plan of the General Staff and the beginning of its implementation does not change anything in assessing the attack of Nimechchini on the SRSR as aggression. About Hitler’s preventive attack, you can’t buti y movi, moreover, it’s been brought up that German kerіvnitstvo neither earlier, nor at Chernivtsi 1941. not a few data about the preparation of the Chervonoy army to the offensive. At the link with the cim, the version itself about the preventive war of Nimechchini looks like a tidbit of absurdity: it turns out that Hitler zirvav radyansky attack, knowing nothing about the preparation of such a wine. Whether it was a mirkuvannya z drive that bulo b, yakbi Hitler attacked the SRSR for two months, put up to fortune-telling. Realistically, from 22 chervnya 1941. The Red Army had a chance to fight German aggression.

A.I. Utkin, a modern Russian historian, about the causes of shock and heroic support of the Chervonoi Army.

I tried to marvel at the night of the eyes of the Germans. The first day of the war, scurrying, the linden of the month, the Germans walk more quickly, already on the outskirts of Minsk. The first axis is at the note of the German Ober-Lieutenant: the lion-handed judges already leaned 100 km ahead, the right-handed judges also go ahead, and we zupinilis, unknowingly, why on the right. Trying to get around the positions of the Russian evil - mine field, let’s go right-handed - ambush, and it’s worth the whole day, we’ll cover the whole front. Everything was unstoppable, because the cooks had managed to get into the Russian tank. The Radyansky tank was beaten up on the mound, if the wines were lifted, the blow of the crushing straight into the new one, the armor was broken, and the cook had learned something, no matter what: a yearbook, like a speech, souvenirs, nothing special. And when the hatch was opened, everything became clear. Below in the tank, standing on his knees, a dead Russian captain, at the hand of the new bula a walkie-talkie, and at the blinds, so the tank’s opening is called, at the tank, holding the whole position, standing at the top of the mountains, and everything was visible, . The corpses of his comrades were laid out for a lieutenant, he died, being wounded in the same smorid, but he stood until the end. This struck the Nazis, and they succeeded that this war would not be similar to the one that was in Poland and France. First German Ober-Lieutenant write that it’s cold at the feet, that it’s not so easy to get along so easily.

A. Filippov, about the readiness of the Red Army before the war near the Red Army, 1941 (1992)

.... Radiadyansku Vіsykov Kerivnitroy, Gotiye to Viyni Znimechinoy, rolled up by the house of the Rock Kilkisho Perevgi over the Wehrmacht, especially at the tanks of the Ioma, he was bursting with Tamniyu Bagatorazov Chervonnya

The warriors were poorly trained in the methods of daily warfare, weakly beaten, insufficiently organized. On a low level, there were radio communications, management, interaction, intelligence, tactics.

The main reason for the defeat of our troops in 1941 was the unpreparedness of the Chervona Army to conduct a modern maneuver war with the enemy, we are preparing ourselves for such a war.

A. Smirnov, current Russian historian, about the publication of the words of General Ilarion Tolkonyuk. 2005

Tell Tolkonyuk once again confirm that the number of volunteers (not through the ability to repair the enemy, but through the negligence to fight) the tasks of the Red Army soldiers in 1941 are full, described in the German literature, even in some propaganda.<.>

Vin draws a picture of an extremely soft, superciliously centralized management of the military, which does not allow commanders to stand lower, to pour into the development of the undersides, and those who stand up, which irritated the lower ones.

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at France, at the frontier of paris

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along the banks of the water with the growth of cattail - tse taka marsh grass outline

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n.i. Vavilov the glittering visions of the 20th century. Vavilov, having shown himself to be a yak, a revolutionary and fahіvets іz zahist roslyn.

father Ivan Illich Vavilov (1863-1928) - a merchant of another guild and a hromada dyach, born in the rural homeland of the Volokolamsk county. before the revolution, he was the director of the manufacturing company "delete ta vaviliv". mother of Oleksandr Mikhailivna Vavilova (1868-1938), born Postnikova, - the daughter of an artist-painter, a kind of pratsyuvav at the Prokhorivsky manufactory.

cіkavі facts

Until the beginning of the Great Vitchiznya war, we founded the Institute of Roslinnitsa Volodya near the Tsarskoye Selo, the largest collection of the world in the world. under the hour of the blockade, the specialists of the institute saved the collection for the presence of electricity and interruptions in scorching.

In the winter of 1941-1942, five specialists from the institute died of starvation, as they were forced to look at the stocks of cereals like I was eating. the vltku of the vecheni was imprisoned under artillery shelling.

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on the banks of the streaming mountain rivers of a distant place, you can immediately shoot a mandarin duck. tse tsіkava bird with a brightly different plumage, nibi zіyshla z like a little baby. zabarvlennya male tangerines bright orange, pistkov, blue, green and other colors. I will add a neat bright-red dziobik to the big head. they themselves are not so beautifully dressed, like their cavalry - more of them have a brown color, and the cover is alive with stringy trees.

tangerines took a fancy to the taiga of the Khabarovsk and Primorye Territories - similar lands of our region. the stench is transient, so with the advent of cold weather they are driven to the pivden, to the territory of China and Japan. at the link of their love to the trees, the pitchings give priority to the rivers and waterholes, which along the banks are overgrown with fox. Mandarin ducks are especially comfortable in windbreaks, de richly ukrittiv, and it is easy to get together with different nebezpeki.

on the vіdmіnu vіd vіdmіnu vіd lshostі іnshih jocks, mandarin ducks often love to sit on the chicks of trees, and rightly settle down on them, not respecting the paws. stink nests also grow high above the ground - in the hollows of trees, so that the river brace grows. through these kachenya, who had just shriveled up, trembled from the hollows from the great heights, to drink for their mother until the water. fly tangerines swiftly, strimko and love robiti sharp turns, which, madly, rush into the air of hizhakiv. the stench is also good and on the water - the tangerines swim miraculously, lifting the tail uphill, but do not like pirrati.

tangerines are monogamous, tobto having grown up and hung out once, they stink a couple for the whole season (which happens not so often in the middle). the male will charm the female with his own love, fighting with other males for the right to deprive offspring. after the maternity period, the males molt and spend almost all their beauty, flocking similar to females. but until the coming spring, the stench will be dressed up again in the quarter of the fire.

in Chinese culture, a pair of tangerines (yuanyan) is a symbol of fidelity and is often used in figurative art, as well as in folklore. This is such a Chinese order about a loving couple: “two tangerines, which are playing by the water.” on a wedding day they decorate with figurines of tsikh birds, so that among the young people there was good luck. images of yaskravih kachechok can be seen on the paintings of Chinese vases and other ships.

Eating at cichok jocks is typical for the family: other amphibians and fish, coma, ravliki. on the trees, birds can grow no less lively acorns, and people take away the opportunity to feed on rice fields. so sometimes tangerines caress the caviar of ribs and chrobakami.

Historians and military leaders of the Great Veteran War are practically one-sided in their thoughts, which is the greatest suttivim prorakhunkom, which, having marked the tragedy of 1941, has become outdated the doctrine of Vedennya war, which was the end of the Chervona Army.
Historians and military leaders of the Great Veteran War are practically one-sided in their thoughts, which is the greatest suttivim prorakhunkom, which, having marked the tragedy of 1941, has become outdated the doctrine of Vedennya war, which was the end of the Chervona Army.

The successors V. Solovyov and Yu. Kirshin, laying the blame on Stalin, Voroshilov, Timoshenko and Zhukov, say that the stench "did not understand the cob period of the war, pardoned the planning, the strategic roaring, the direct head blow."

Unstoppable blitzkrieg

Irrespective of those that the blitzkrieg strategy was successfully tested by the Wehrmacht in the European campaign, the military command ignored it and rozrakhovuvala on the best possible cob of war in Germany and the SSR.

“The people’s commissar of defense and the General Staff respected that there was a war between such great powers, like Nimechchina and the Radiansky Union, it was guilty of starting a scheme that had been founded earlier: the main forces would join the battle in a few days after the cordon battles,” said Zhukov.

The command of the RSCHA announced that they would start an attack with foreign forces, and only after the cordon battles would the outbreak of the head battles be completed. The General Staff has been rehabilitated, so that the docks of the army are actively defending, exposing and supporting the fascists, the country can carry out a large-scale mobilization.

Tim is no less, the analysis of the strategy of warfare in Europe by German military shows that the Wehrmacht succeeded in fronting us with the hard blows of the armored troops, as they supported the aircraft, as if they smashed the enemy’s defenses.

The main goals of the first days of the war were the suffocation of the territory, and the ruination of defensiveness recognized the invasion of the region.
The prorakhunok of the command of the SRSR called before the fact that the German aviation of the first day of the war lost over 1200 combat aircraft and in fact secured its air defense. In the aftermath of the rapt attack, hundreds of thousands of soldiers and officers were driven in, wounded or taken in full. The German command reached its goal: the management of the military units of the Russian Army for the first time was destroyed.

Not far from the roztashuvannya viysk

How to designate a lot of doslidnikiv, the nature of the roztashuvannya of the Radyansk troops is even more viable for a strike on the territory of the Nimechchina, but more fatal for a defensive operation. The deployment, which was formed on the cob of warfare, was formed earlier, in accordance with the plan of the General Staff about the order of preventive strikes on the territory of Nimechi. Zgidno with the spring version of 1940 to the rock of the "Fundamentals of Rooting" came out of vіdmova in the form of a similar dislocation vіysk, prote tіlki on paper.

At the time of the attack of the German army, the military formations of the RSCHA were not seen with fired heads, but were subdivided into three echelons after an operational call one by one. Such prorokhunks of the General Staff allowed the Wehrmacht army to easily achieve numerical superiority and partly undermine the radian troops.

Particularly disturbing was the situation on the "Bilostok ledge", which was a lot of kilometers away from the enemy's battlefield. Such a roztashuvannya military created a threat of a deep hooliganism and sharpening of the 3rd, 4th, and 10th armies of the Western District. The battle was confirmed: literally in a few days, three armies were sharpened and defeated, and on 28 chervnya the Germans marched to Minsk.

Obfuscating counteroffensives

On the 22nd of Cherry on the 7th anniversary of the wound, Stalin's directive was issued, in which it was said: "the troops of the army, with the help of forces, will fall on the fortune-tellers of the forces of that enemy near the region, the stench destroyed the cordon of Radians."

Such an order is evidence of the unreasonableness of the supreme command of the SRSR on the scale of the invasion.
Through pіvroku, if nіmetskiy vіyskі buli vіdkinutі vіd moscow staіl vіmagav counteroffensive and other fronts. There are very few people who can choke you. Regardless of the unpreparedness of the Radian army to conduct a full-scale military action, a counter-offensive was launched by stretching the Ukrainian front - from Tikhvin to the Kerch Pivostrov.

Moreover, the troops took back the order to decipher and subdivide the head forces of the Army Group "Center". The Headquarters overestimated its capabilities: the Chervona Army at that stage of the war showed itself unexpectedly enough in the middle of sufficient forces to the head straight, could not massively stop tanks and artillery.
On January 2, 1942, one of the planned operations was launched in the Kharkiv region, which, according to historians, was carried out while ignoring the enemy’s capabilities and unimportant conditions, until such a moment to build a non-fortified bridgehead. On May 17, the Germans hit from two sides and over the course of the day they turned the bridgehead onto the “cauldron”. Close to 240 thousand. radyansky soldiers and officers after the operation were stooped by the crowd.

Inaccessibility of material and technical reserves

Having taken into account the General Staff, what is in the minds of the war, what is being worn out, it is necessary to bring the material and technical equipment closer to the war. 340 out of 887 stationary warehouses and bases of the RSCA were rebuked at the cordon districts, including over 30 million shells and min. Only 34 wagons of ammunition were taken near the Brest Fortress area. In Crimea, the largest artillery corps and divisions have moved over the front-line zone, and in the head quarters.
Khid viyskovyh diy showing the nebuchnost of such a solution. In a short term, military equipment, ammunition and fire-oil materials were already impossible to introduce. The result of them was either undermined or slaughtered by the Germans.
Another pardon of the General Staff showed a great crowd at the airfields of the aircraft, while masking it with the help of PPO were weak. While the forward units of the army aviation were based somewhere close to the cordon - 10-30 km., then the units of the front-line and long-range aviation were deployed somewhere far away - from 500 to 900 km.

Golovnі forces to Moscow

In the middle of the linden of 1941, the Army Group "Center" broke at the break at the Radian defenses between the rivers of the Western Dvina and the Dnipro. Now the way to Moscow was clear. Transferred to the German command For some kind of tribute, on the path of the army group "Center" appeared zoseredzheno up to 40% of the number of the special warehouse of the Russian Army, artillery and close to 35% of the savage number aircraft and tanks
The tactics of the Radyansk command were left invariably: hit the enemy in the forehead, take him down, and then, with obvious forces, go over to the counteroffensive. main task- for any price, lose Moscow - it was beaten down, the protée more zeseredzhenikh on the Moscow straight line of the army wasted to the "cauldrons" under Vyazma and Bryansk. At two "cauldrons" 7 field administrations of the army out of 15, 64 divisions out of 95, 11 tank regiments out of 13 and 50 artillery brigades out of 62 were slumped.
The General Staff ensured the possibility of the future of the German military Pivdn, prote more reserves in the middle of the direct line of Stalingrad and the Caucasus, and Moscow. Such a strategy caused the success of the German army on Pivdenny directly.

The failures of the first months of the Great Vitchiznyanoi War for the SRSR were conditioned by a wealth of objective and subjective factors. On this topic, a lot of work was written, a numerical study was carried out. An analysis of the combat actions and an assessment of the tactful and strategic decision of the command of the Evil Forces and the political support of the Radyansky Union of the Church today.

1. Unpreparedness of the Red Army before the war

Preparation before great war, Rozpochata in 1939, rіzke zbіlshennya zbіlshennya Armored Forces of the SRSR, the great number of military equipment, combat dosvіd, nabutiy in Spain, on Hasanі and Khalkhіn-Golі, in the Winter war Chernivtse, it was given to the army from the Wehrmacht.

Prote as a whole, the country was not yet ready for such a total war. A rich division, formed in 1939-1941, had a small uneven number and was poorly provided with combat equipment, but it was badly driven by it. Далися взнаки і репресії кінця 30-х років, коли значна частина досвідчених командних кадрів була знищена, і їх місце зайняли менш компетентні або малодосвідчені командири, на відміну від німецької армії, в якій всі генерали і більшість офіцерів мали бойовий досвід ще часів Першої світової війни , and remember all the campaigns of 1939-1941.

The transport capacity of Nimechchini was an order of magnitude greater than that of the Radyansk Union. The Germans could more broadly shift the supply, regroup the military, organize their deliveries. SRSR maw significant human resources, ale tsi resources were richer less mobile, lower german. On the cob of military combat, the Wehrmacht overturned the Chervona army for the number of vintage cars, approximately udvіchі, tobto. buv rukhlivishy. Є so zrazki, yakі just do not have a small analogue in the radyansky zbroynih forces. Tse shvidk_sn_ tractors of important artillery and armored personnel carriers.

In a flash, the German army was better prepared before the war, lower than the Chervona Army. As the Soviet Socialist Republic was preparing for the war before the war less than two years, then Nіmechchina began to strengthen the development of military forces and that military craft in the wake of the arrival of Hitler to power. For example, in Nіmechchinі zagalniy vіyskovy obov'yazok was renewed on 16 birch 1935, and in the SRSR - less than 1 spring 1939.

2. Strategic forerunners of the command of the Chervonoy Army

But, as the unpreparedness of the Chervona Army before the war became one of the reasons for the defeat of the 1941 r., then in 1942 the rotations of the radyansk military were already confirmed, small behind the shoulders were not only the defeats of those steps, but the victory (Moscow battle, , continuation of the defense of Sevastopol). Prote himself in 1942. the Wehrmacht reached its maximum push on the territory of the Radyansky Union. German warriors reached Stalingrad, Voronezh, Novorossiysk, Mount Elbrus.

The reason for these shocks was the reassessment of the commanders (and in the first quarter of Stalin) the successes of the radyansky battles during the winter counteroffensive of 1941-1942. The German troops blew out of Moscow and Rostov-on-Don, and also blocked the Kerch Pivostrіv and reduced the pressure on Sevastopol. Ale, there is a residual stench of boules, especially for the direct one. Logical boules and German active diї 1942 p. directly at the pivdennomu itself - the forces of the Wehrmacht suffered the least.

The devilish failure of the Chervonoy Army in 1942. became the Kharkiv operation, as it cost the irrevocable expenditure of 171 thousand soldiers of the Russian Army. Well, I know, like in 1941, the generals - once again O.M. Vasilevsky was asked for permission to visit the military, and Stalin did not give such permission again.

p align="justify"> An important aspect of the failures of the Chervona Army during the winter counteroffensive of 1941-1942. Bula was the necessary number of tank squadrons, which was seriously indicated on the mobility of the Radyansk troops. The infantry and the cavalry broke through the defenses of the Germans, but on whom everything often ended, it was possible for no one and nothing to sharpen the enemy, to that in the living force the victory was minimal. As a result, the insults of the "cauldrons" (Dem'yansky and Kholmsky) were vryatovanny by the Germans without any problems after they were reinforced. Before that, German troops in these boilers were supported by transport aviation, it was important to fight against such a great burden through the great losses of the Radian aviation in the first month of the war.

With a wide pardon, it was incorrectly assigned directly to the head blows of the opponent. So, in Ukraine, the command of the Pivdenno-Zakhidny Front on the front with General Kirponos was constantly afraid of the turn of the 1st tank group on pivden near the Lviv ledge. This led to inconvenient throwing of mechanized corps, and, as a result, to great losses (at the battle near Dubno-Lutsk-Brody - over 2.5 thousand tanks, under the hour of the Lepel counterattack - about 830 tanks, under Uman - over 200 tanks, under Kiev - over 400 tanks.)

3. Repressions in the pre-war period

For various tributes, in the course of repressions 1937-1941 r.b. bulo shot, arrested or zvіlne z evil forces from 25 to 50 thousand officers. Spend the most when you know the biggest command depot - from brigade commanders (major generals) to marshals. Tse was strongly marked on the days of the Radianian wars on the cob of the war.

On the right, in the fact that old, informed commanders recognized reprisals, they went through the school of the First Light, Radiansko-Polish, Gromadyanskaya war(Primakov, Putna, Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich, Blyukher, Yegorov, and many others), and young officers came to this month, as they often did not lack the command of great military forces, the same in the war against the beautiful army of the world.

In this order, until the beginning of the war, approximately 70-75% of the commanders and political instructors spent no more than one day in their settlements. Until the summer of 1941 the middle of the command warehouse of the ground troops of the Chervonoy Army is less than 4.3% of the officers of Mali sanctuary, 36.5% - secondary special education, 15.9% did not lack military education, and 43.3% completed only short courses of junior lieutenants or were called up to the army from the reserve.

Ale, to get a solid military record is far from zavzhd, help me to win. For example, General D.T. Kozlov fought in 1915, but could not resist the victory of the Wehrmacht at the hour of the battle near Crimea in spring 1942. This is how it went with V.M. Gordova - three-time military experience, commanding the front (Stalingradsky), low luck, as if they were trapiling for any other commander, and, as a last, - planting a son.

In this way, the already appointed reasons for the defeat of the Chervonoy Army were superimposed and the day of a good informed command, which at once led to the greedy debacles of 1941 and the lesser peace of 1942. I less until 1943 the military leaders of the Chervonoi Army could arbitrarily destroy the mysticism of mechanized warfare, sharpening and reducing the great forces of the enemy, the arduous zagalno-front offensives (similar to the German litas of 1941).