Lyuban offensive operation: zabutiy fought for Leningrad. Lyuban offensive operation. History of the military operations of the Great Vitchiznian War of Lyuban offensive operation of 1942
Lyuban offensive operation (September 7, 1942 - April 30, 1942) - an offensive operation of the Radian troops near the Great Veteran War.
On September 7, 1942, the troops of the 2nd shock army broke through the enemy defenses in the area of the settlement of M'yasniy Bor (on the left birch of the Volkhov river) and deeply wedged into the yogo roztashuvannya (near the straight line of Lyuban). Ale, not gaining strength for a distant offensive, the army leaned back at an important camp. The enemy of the kіlka once interrupted її communications, creating a threat of sharpening. Until the 26th of June, the enemy was far away from their miraculous and Novgorodian grouping, creating a perfect front with the river Polist and the inner front with the river Glushitsya. In this manner, the communications of the 2nd shock army and the number of days of the 59th army were interrupted.
The commander of the Volkhov operational group, Lieutenant-General M. S. Khozin, did not follow the directive of the Stavka (mid-May) on the introduction of the military army. As a result, she leaned back in her stubble. With the help of the commanders of the Volkhiv Front, they created a small corridor in the distance, through which the divisions of the armed forces, demoralized soldiers and commanders came through. On the 25th of the worms, the opponent closed the corridor. On the 12th line, the commander of another shock army, Lieutenant General A. A. Vlasov, was full.
54th Army under the command of General I. I. Fedyuninsky did not succumb to his boss. Її parts, having recognized the great losses near the Pogost area, broke through twenty kilometers in advance and did not reach Lyuban. In the midst of the course of several hundred thousand highest battles, the 54th army, having spent the whole of its warehouse in May, got stuck for a long time near the forests and swamps. In his memoirs I. I. Fedyuninsky to dosit self-critically evaluates his actions in the settlement of the commander of the army, he knows that part of the blame for the failures lies on him. Zokrema, as the commander of the army, did not organize a clear interaction between the days of the army;
The operation of the 2nd shock, 52nd and 59th armies sent a memorial to the defenders of Leningrad, as they could not see a new assault, pulled on themselves over 15 enemy divisions (including 6 divisions, that one brigade was transferred from Zakhidnoy Europe). ), allowed the Radiansky Viysks under Leningrad to take the initiative. The command of the 18th German army meant that "after breaking through with a frontal attack on the Leningrad front, then a part of the 18th army would have been spent, and the leftovers would have been thrown out." However, the Leningrad Front was not in a moment the same as the leader of a strike.
K. A. Meretskov, Marshal of the Radyansky Union at the book “In the Service of the People,” wrote that 16 thousand people were sharpened from the military warehouse of the 2nd shock army. In the battles of the 2nd shock army, 6 thousand people perished, and 8 thousand appeared missing.
As a result of the achievements of "Russia and the SRSR in the wars of the twentieth century" irrevocably inflicted on the Volkhov Front and the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front under the hour of the Luban operation from September 7 to April 30, 1942. – 95064 people In operation, the removal of the 2nd shock army from January 13 - April 10, 1942 (2nd shock, 52nd and 59th armies of the Volkhiv front) - 54774 people. Usyi - 149 838. Let’s take the figure, deafened by the Germans, to the point of respect - 32,759 soldiers, 649 garmats, 171 tanks, 2904 automatic weapons, a lot of launchers and other weapons - and reports about people who made their way through sharpening. A. Isaev at the book “A short course in the history of VVV. The advance of Marshal Shaposhnikov ”writes that before their deaths, 9462 individuals were sharpened to 29 worms, including 5494 individuals injured and ill. Up to 10 lime - 146 osib. Okremi soldiers and commanders went out not on the march, but on the day. Approximately it is possible to bring the total number of wounded and dead wounds - up to 107,471 people (Volkhiv front, 54th army of the Leningrad front), with virahuvannyami who made their way to their own and polonenikh.
| Turn around on the date 7 September |
Comments:
The Lyuban offensive operation of the Red Army was launched on September 7, 1942, it was too small to break through the defenses of the Nazis, break through to the teel to the 1st Army Corps, hit the shore of Lyuban and remotely operate at the bek of Leningrad to break the blockade. Vzimku part of the Volkhov front in the distance to cross the Volkhov, zakripitsya and break through the gap in the German defenses, yak allowed to enter the army in the teel of the Germans to storm Lyuban. Before the birch part of the 2nd Shock Army, they pushed 75 km to the back, reaching the railway station Rogavka, and 40 km to the pivnich, not to the south of Lyuban 6-10 km. The front of the army stretched for 200 km. The order to advance was far along the sparsely populated leafy-swampy land called until the establishment of the "Lyubanskaya Plyashka" square bl. 3 yew sq. with a narrow neck near the mist of the river - 11-16 km of the neck and approx. 4 km zavdovka vіd. M'yasniy Bir village to Krechno village. On the cob birch tree, the Germans, having anticipated the Radyansk offensive, were preparing forces to strike with the corridor of the troops of the RSCHA. On March 15, 1942, the corridor was attacked from Spaska Polist by 4 SS "Polizen", 61 front and 121 front. On the 3rd day, on the way to Myasny Bor, they attacked 58 front and 126 front. Thus began the operation Raubtier (Khizhak). 03/18/42 - a pivnіchna group cut the pіvnіchnu road of the road ("Erіka"), and on 19.03.42 - the pіvnіchnа group buried that remaining road ("Dora") to a friend. Until 20 Birch, the grouping closed the steel tongs. After the burying began to prepare the positions of the river Glushitsa and Polist. Parts of the sharpened armies tried to break through the corridor back. Until 31 January, if the ring is still full, the corridor continues to pass from hand to hand. For the second time, yoga was punched back 6 times. At qi period vіn pulsed to a width of 2.5 km to a few hundreds of meters. Under the shelling and cross fire, a small amount of sharpened parts were fired. On May 14, the Headquarters allowed to attack, scho zahlinuvsya, and to lead the way 2 UA to prepare the line Vilkhivka - lake. Tyroca. And on May 22, an order was issued to send the army out of prison. Having pumped the steps, the Germans took it baked and tried to tighten the neck of the Lyubansky "bear". At the new offensive, 254 Spanish front, 61 front, 121 front, 4 TD SS, 58 front, 20md and 2 pb SS closed the corridor on May 31, 1942, leaving 9 divisions and 6 brigades with the police R5K2U of the entire bl. 50 000 osib. Sharpened parts recognized the artillery, mortar shelling and bombardment from repeat. And yet, all the same, the Radian armies tried to get out of prison. 06/22/42 part of our 2UA was able to see sharpened approx. 7000 osіb through a narrow corridor. And already 25.06. The Viysk Rada divided the armies into different groups for an independent breakthrough. For tribute to the General Staff until 01.07, 9600 people went far away. And yet, on June 28, 1942, Hitler was informed about the victory at the Volkhiv battle. 649 garmats, 171 tanks and 32,759 soldiers were buried in full. Of these, 793 medical practitioners. Zagalom Lyubanskaya operation cost us 403 yew. costs, of which 150 thousand. irrevocably.
A. S. Turgaev, N. Yu. Shpirina
LIUBAN OPERATION: PREPARATION FOR THE COMING
Keywords:
Lyuban offensive operation, blockade of Leningrad, army group "Pivnich"
The article is dedicated to the history of the Volkhov Front, the main goals of its creation - the defeat of the army group "Pivnich" and the distant lifting of the blockade of Leningrad.
On the basis of archival documents and spogadіv suchasnikіv, the authors describe the spіvvіdnennia forces, the overrun of combat actions and the causes of failures of the Lyuban operation.
At the chest, 1941 The Radianian troops sounded the advance of the German armies by stretching the Radianian-Nimetian front. In the wake of the counterattack under Moscow and Tikhvin, the enemy, having recognized the first great defeat and turmoil, would go on the defensive. It created a favorable atmosphere for the change in the situation near Leningrad, the complete lifting of the blockade and the defeat of the Pivnich army group.
At the final stage of the Tikhvin-Volkhov offensive operation, the Headquarters of the Central Committee worked out a plan for the liquidation of the enemy's enemy near Leningrad. December 12, 1941 Moscow had a rada, for yakіy
Luban offensive operation, Siege of Leningrad, group of armies “North”
Material - grants for the history of the front of Volkhov, the main objectives of its creation - to commemorate the "North" group and the subsequent lifting of Siege of Leningrad.
On the basis of an important number of archival documents and memos of contemporary Vlasniks, parity forces, purposes and reasons of failures of Luban operation were voiced.
were present in chief commander I. V. Stalin, Chief of the General Staff Marshal B. M. Shaposhnikov, Commander of the Leningrad Front M. S. Khozin. Commander of the 4th Army K. A. Meretskov. Together with them, in the discussed plan for the great offensive near Leningrad, the secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee, a member of the Politburo of the CPSU (b) A. A. Zhdanov, the chief of staff of the 4th army brigade commander G. D. Stelmakh, and also the commanders of the 26th and 59th ї armies, as if they were fighting on the Volkhov, - Lieutenant General G. G. Sokolov and Major General I. V. Galanin. Marshal B. M. Shaposhnikov, a spiv-
Until the 65th anniversary of the Great Peremoga
schіv about the decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to establish the Volkhiv front with the method of defeating the enemy’s aggregation, like blocking Leningrad from the blockade.
The line of the new front is small to pass the river Volkhov, starting from the village of Kirishi and ending at the lake Ilmen. The front flank of the front was between the 11th army and the Novgorod army group of the Pivnichno-Zakhidny front, and the pivnichny flank was with the 54th army, the yak was abandoned at the warehouse of the Leningrad front. K. A. Meretskov urged to transfer the 54th army to the Volkhov front, because they were fighting on the old blockade at once with the 4th and 52nd armies and could not make direct contact with the Leningrad front. However, Khozin and Zhdanov were against such a decision, motivating their thoughts, that the 54th army would help to break through the blockade, helping their troops with the soldiers of the Leningrad Front. With all the difficulties in postachanni, the administration of the army from the besieged Leningrad was not taken to respect. Having listened to all the arguments of Zhdanov and Khozin, Stalin knows we can be pleased with this mess, but, as K. A. Meretskov writes, “it’s better for Leningrad, let it be like that.”
The Lyuban offensive operation (div. Fig. 1) was conceived by the Radyansk command in the form of a deep break through the front against
nick with one-hour sharpening that defeat of the grouping of the armies "Pivnich", like rimalo Leningrad near the kiltsі blockade. Before the holidays at Sichni 1942 The radyansk command of the milkovo respected that the enemy had been hit by Moscow and Tikhvin ill-treated, and thrived on success. After the victory under Tikhvin and Volkhov in infants, 1941 before the troops of the newly created Volkhov, and the formation of the Leningrad and Pivnichno-Zahidny fronts, the task was to defeat the enemy’s grouping under Leningrad and take out the blockade, guarding the two recent Sinyavinsky offensive operations of 1941.
As soon as the Lyuban offensive operation of 1942 was prepared, it was called out as a military necessity, to destroy and drive the enemy out of the territory of the SRSR. The blockade of Leningrad, which allowed land communications from the country, called for severe famine and high mortality among the civilian population, so the supply of food in a sufficient amount was impossible. The presence of stocks of fire and the supply of electricity made the camp of Leningraders even more difficult. For such a situation, the de-blockade of Leningrad, in order of defeating the grouping of the German troops on a straight line,
Rice. 1. Luban operation.
Roztashuvannya viysk in front of the stands of the Chervonoy Army
Turgaev A. S., Shpirina N. Yu. Lyuban operation: preparation for the attack
Until the 65th anniversary of the Great Peremoga
swelled up a vinyatkovoy value. This was a viyskove, political and economic task at once, in terms of the term, it’s rich in why the situation on the Radian-Nimets front lay and the prestige of the country in the international arena.
The blockade of the “colisca of the revolution”, the untimeliness of changing the situation near Leningrad, at its own mercilessness, repaired a singing moral pressure on the stonework of the country. To this, from Moscow, the commanders of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts sounded constantly, in a sudden advance, to defeat the German grouping, to lift the blockade. Tsіy metі buli ordering all human and material resources, like a small army in the battle for Leningrad.
The leading edge of the German defense in front of the Meretskov front was passing importantly along the western bank of the Volkhov. The mirror of the river was shot through with a sharp aiming flank fire. Along the nasipah of the bay and the Kirishi-Novgorod highway, passing another defensive line. Vin folded s switching lines strengthening near the settlements and on the heights with a good organization of a fire connection between them. From the riverbed of the river Volkhov to the nasip of the bay, the boulevard was occupied by engineering fences and
pine forests with prickly dart with small fields, forest blockages and land mines. The green surface of the steep western bank of the river was an important crossing for hunting without special arrangements. German strongholds were full of machine guns and mortars. The troops of the enemy, who were defending themselves, were supported by strong artillery and finished off with hard air strikes. Such a defense was to be done by the soldiers of the Volkhov Front in the Lyuban offensive operation.
The Volkhov Front, which included the 4th and 52nd armies, were reinforced by the warehouse of two armies. 59th Army Major General I. V. Galanina was formed in the Siberian Viysk Okruz following the directive of the Headquarters on the 2nd leaf fall of 1941. Before it included 6 riflemen and 2 cavalry divisions. The total number of soldiers of the 59th Army on September 1, 1941 was 65,452 people. (The average staffing of the rifle division is 10,910 soldiers and commanders), 381 armored personnel carriers, including 143 garmati calibers of 76.2 mm and more. Tank slabs at the warehouse of the army were daily.
Weaker behind the yakіsny warehouse was the 26th army, renamed into the 2nd shock. Vaughn was molded in the Volga Viysk district in the autumn of 1941. i mayzhe piv-
nistyu was formed from 3 rifle brigades. There was one division (327-a) in the cob warehouse, and 8 brigades. On the 1st day of 1942, if the 2nd shock army was transferred to the warehouse of the Volkhov Front, there were 43,970 men, 71 tanks in two tank battalions, 462 armatures (of which 113 caliber in 76.2 mm and more). Half-baked boules were well-equipped. For example, the 327th Striletsky Division had 11,832 men, and the 23rd Striletsky Brigade had 4,524 soldiers. The command warehouse of the army was formed more importantly than people of the middle prize age, as they were rebuked at the reserve during the last three years.
December 17, 1941 Commander of the Volkhiv Front, General of the Army K. A. Meretskov, was given the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. It said: “The military front at warehouse 4, 59, 2nd shock and 52nd armies will defeat the enemy, who is defending along the western birch of the Volkhov river, and with the lead forces of the army, move to the Lyuban front, Cholovo station.” Nadali was punished, advancing at the pivnіchno-zahіdny directly, sharpen the enemy, who is defending near Leningrad, and at the vzaєmodії z vіisky.
mi of the Leningrad front is full of yogo, and in times of vidmovi building in full - blame.
The skin army was given specific instructions: the 4th - to advance at the outrageous direction of Kirishi-Tosno and at the mutual support of the 54th army of the Leningrad Front to clear and defeat the enemy, who hung on the pivnich of Mga to Lake Ladozkoye. Nadal, advancing near Krasno-Gvardіysk (Gatchina) and Ropsha, take the armies of the Leningrad Front near the enemy’s defence, which will take away points. The 59th army was guilty of advancing directly at Gruzino (de German troops saved a foothold on the Volkhov birch), Siversky, Solsoviy.
The 2nd shock army was ordered by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to protrude at the direct stations Thicket and Nizovsky with a long-range strike on Luz.
In front of the 52nd army at the warehouse
5 Striletsky divisions (46, 288, 259, 267 and 111th) from the order of the Novgorod operational group were assigned the task of capturing Novgorod and at the direct line of Solets, ensuring the onset of the Volkhov Front pіvnіchny zahіd.
The 54th Army of the Leningrad Front took the order, formulated in the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. divisions, 6th sea.
Turgaev A. S., Shpirina N. Yu. Lyuban operation: preparation for the attack
Until the 65th anniversary of the Great Peremoga
brigades, 21 TD, 81 and 882 gaps go on the offensive at once with the troops of the Volkhov Front and from the commanders: in cooperation with the 4th Army of the Volkhov Front, which is right on the line right off the bat."
Putting before the armies the task of advancing, the Headquarters secured, after the successful Tikhvin-Volkhov offensive operation in the 1941 r. the enemy, having recognized the great losses, and in a short term, did not realize in total engagement the combativeness of his units on this division of the front. In Moscow, they respected that after the shock under Moscow and Tikhvin, the morale of the German soldiers was broken, the military opponent in the winter minds was disorganized and could not build a serious support. For this reason, the Lyuban operation to defeat the Pivnich army group was planned as part of the great offensive of the Radyansk troops in 1942. from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea, as it is not enough to bring about the defeat of that Nazi fascist troops from the occupied territory of the SRSR. “The Germans were ruined in the face of the blows near Moscow, the stench was rottenly prepared until the winter. At the same time, the greatest moment in the distance for the transition to the
stupas," vvazhav I. V. Stalin.
It is not enough to help the military enemy to re-arrange, necessary to bring them into order and replenishment.
On September 5, a meeting of the Headquarters was held at Moscow, which praised the decision about the violent offensive from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea. G.K. Zhukov and N.A. Voznesensky hung against the plan. Ale їх prove about those that the army is not yet able to dispose of sufficient material resources for such large-scale actions, they were not accepted to respect. After the meeting, the Chief of the General Staff, B. M. Shaposhnikov, said to Zhukov: “We had a good fight: the chain was behind the Supreme Leader.”
G. K. Zhukov, having spoken to the people of the city the idea of a camp near Leningrad: “What is worth the attack of our troops near Leningrad and on the right-wing straight, there our soldiers stand in front of the serious defense of the enemy. Without the presence of the hard artillery stench, the stench cannot break through the defense, they themselves know the great, nothing is not true losses. I am for those who can help the front of the front straight ahead and lead a greater offensive.
Book X. Polman Volkhov: 900 days of fighting for Leningrad. 1941-1944” the decision is assessed as follows: “Those who the German front on the Volkhov, having gained even more significant forces, insanely, literally, made the camp of a great important battle that repeatedly broken through the defense of the German central grouping of troops. Those forces, like the Radianian command, introduced at the victorious station during the attack on the Volkhov, could have succumbed to the result of the operation of the German army group “Center”. Stalin, having obtained that very pardon, like Hitler, - he wanted to attack sharply, and thus he achieved a vicious victory anywhere.
The headquarters of the Supreme High Command praised the decision about the attack on the entire Radianian-German front by nine fronts from the Baltic to the Black Sea. In front of the troops of the Leningrad, Volkhov fronts, the right flank of the Pivnichno-Zakhidny front, and the Baltic Fleet was given the task of defeating the Pivnich army group. Directive of the Supreme High Command rates on 17 December
1941 the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts about the attack on Lyubansky directly lost their strength.
In the process of preparing for the operation, the command of the Volkhiv Front failed to strengthen the army on the direct headstrike. Up to the 9th army dodatkovo with formula
111th and 288th rifle divisions, 163rd and 166th tank battalions were transferred to Timchasovo baths. To the warehouse of the 2nd shock army, it was transferred to the same formulas "timchasovo" of the 259th rifle division. After I broke through the front of the fortifications from the warehouse of the 52nd army, the part of that front was turned back, so that the army could attack directly at the ordered one.
Директивою Ставки перед військами Північно-Західного фронту ставилося завдання правим крилом завдати удару у напрямку Стародавньої Руси, Сільці, Дно, перерізавши комунікації новгородської групи противника, й у взаємодії з військами лівого крила Волховського фронту завдати їй поразки, сприяючи цим вирішенню головного завдання блокади Ленінграда.
The Leningrad Front Mav "shelter the Volkhov Front in defeating the enemy, which is defending near Leningrad, and at the fort of Leningrad from the blockade." Viznachayuchi zavdannya, The Headquarters came out of the fact that the massive spіvvіdshennya of forces on the pіvnіchno-zahіdny straight, from the improvement of the reinforcements that were coming, it was formed on the melancholy of the radian troops. on the
1 September 1942 army group "Pivnich" bulk 665 ths. lyudina, 6 thousand. garmat and mortars and 160 medium and light tanks. At the front for the day
Turgaev A. S., Shpirina N. Yu. Lyuban operation: preparation for the attack
Until the 65th anniversary of the Great Peremoga
Ladozskogo lake diyalo 13 fortune-telling divisions. However, the number of German troops, assigned to the Radyansk dzherelakh, did not fit with the tribute to the headquarters of the Pivnich army group, as they had at their lavas at once from the received forces of the reserve of the head command and the aviation coverage of no more than 450 thousand. osib. The armies of the Volkhov Front were opposed by the enemy's grouping of 167 thousand. person1.
Warehouse of German soldiers on the 1st September 1942 offensive: the 16th army of the army group "Pivnich" (z'dnannya on the pіvnіch vіd Novgorod) included the 38th army corps at the warehouse of the 250th guilt regiment, the 126th and 215th infantry divisions, the 39th motorized corps at warehouse 61-ї pikhotnoy,
20th motorized and 8th tank divisions.
The interchange line with the 18th army passed along the arm of the Ti-roku river. At the right-flank divisions of the 18th Army, they stood against the Volkhov Front, the lines of defense on the right (skhіdny) flank of the army, having taken the 1st Army Corps at the warehouse of four infantry divisions: 291, 21, 11 and 254th. After the strikes under Tikhvin, the divisions had a great un-
from German divisions and dowry parts.
a set of a special warehouse and a reduction in fire pressure at the svyazku from the vtratoy at the battles of artillery and mortars. Prote command of the group of armies "Pivnich" robbed of energy, to increase the combat strength of these divisions for the marching regiments, to transfer the ammunition and military equipment from other peasants to the front. Therefore, the aggregation of the enemy before the beginning of the battle on the Volkhov borders increased and continued to grow in the course of the battles for the recruitment of new divisions from the other divisions of the front from Western Europe.
In the cities of Leningrad, Volkhov and Pivnichno-Zakhidny fronts, on that very date, there were 725 thousand. man, 9 thousand garmat and mortars, 230 important and medium tanks. However, without a hitch in the future gap at the warehouse of the Volkhov Front and the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front, there were 325,672 people. . Rozpodіl special warehouse for the armies and parts of the front order is presented in Table. one.
The Volkhiv front with the arrival of two new armies and parts of the Novgorod operational group maw prevailed over the enemy in living forces by 1.5 times, in garmats and mortars - by 1.6 times, in letaks - by 1.3 times. On the 1st day of 1942 The Volkhiv front united: 23 rifle divisions,
Table 1
Warehouse of the soldiers of the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts near the Sich, 1942.
Number of divisions Number of divisions Number of brigades Number of small battalions (tank, ground, airborne) Number of special warehouse Number of tanks Number of garmat and mortars
54th Army of the Leningrad Front 11 2 2 83 549/69 363 18 1156
Volkhiv front, including army: 25 9 25 242 123/222 490 220 2048
4-а 9 1 9 69 503/ 62 473 146 920
59-а 8 - 8 70 566/ 70 566 - 384
2 stroke 1 8 8 47 422/ 47 422 71 470
52-а 6 - - 51 533/ 38 971 - 254
Parts of the front-line order 6 - - 51 533/38 971 - 254
Total in operation 36 11 27 325 672/291 853 328 3204
Note: the table was compiled on the basis of a report about the combat and numerical warehouse of the military of the Leningrad and Volkhiv fronts for the month of 1942.
The column “Number of a special warehouse” shows: for the numeral officer - the number of combat troops and parts of the combat security (rozvіduvalny, zv'yazku, іnzhenernyh and іn.)2.
Before the beginning of the Luban operation, the numbers of the 2nd shock and 59th armies, and the kіlkіsny warehouse of combat troops and parts of the combat security were the same, because in the armies, there were daily units, and they established services for that body. Significantly, that ahead of time I will come on September 7, 1942. the numerical warehouse of the army deshcho zrіs for the account of the inclusion of deyakih parts before them.
Turgaev A. S., Shpirina N. Yu. Lyuban operation: preparation for the attack
Until the 65th anniversary of the Great Peremoga
8 archery brigades, one grenadier brigade (through the marriage of the archery brigade, it was fired with grenades), 18 outer battalions, 4 cavalry divisions, 1 tank division, 8 armored brigades, 5 artillery regiments, 2 regiments. anti-tank defense, 4 guards mortar artillery regiments of rocket artillery, anti-aircraft artillery
division, bombing station and near-bombing station of air regiments,
3 okremikh attack and 7 okremikh vindictive air regiments and 1 reconnaissance squadron.
The Radyansk troops overpowered the enemy in manpower, which was clearly insufficient for conducting a large-scale offensive operation, as well as for a large number of shells, mortars and tanks. Ale, there was too little ammunition. On the cob of the operation, the front was a quarter of the ammunition load. In the 4th and 52nd armies, for unknown reasons, they were aiming for the armies, there was no telephone wire and radio stations, which made it easier to manage the troops. At the parts, a warm robe was rejected.
On the cob of sichnya 1942 on the settlement of the UPU, the front received air units, fired by Po-2 aircraft. Advance by number
the quality and strength of aviation equipment was on the opponent's battles. Tse perekonlilo showed battles, like nevdovzі razgornulisya dilyantsі front basins of the river Volkhov from the shore of Lake Ladozskoe to Ilmen.
Planning of the operations of 1942 p., Stavka, Yak Viyavilov Zgoda, Clonde poured, Shcho by the reckoning of the Radyani VIISK PID Moskvy not allow the Nimesk-Fashi-fascist command to dilute the Carry of the Army Z'ydnanni, the tanning rings of the ranges, the tannies of the tan.
In Moscow, it was also appreciated that the preparations at the Volkhov, Leningrad and Pivnichno-Zakhidny fronts were sufficient to defeat the enemy near Leningrad and lift the blockade from the taxed area. To that, the Headquarters did not transfer the victoria from this division to the front of strategic reserves, the Crimean armies, which were responsible for the current operation on the cob.
For the winter period, the main commanders, as it was placed in front of the German troops, were the creation of military defense by stretching the Radian-German front. At the order on February 12, 1942, combat operations were carried out on the Skhidny front, with the ear of spring, the head of the land command
of them, the military headquarters of the Nymechchini and the General Staff at the division “for the army group “Pivnich”” ordered: “The group of armies “Pivnich”, having swept around the areas of Pagorba and Old Old Russia, should take the low positions of the 2nd and 10th army corps on the day of the lake . As a result, the army group “Center” will attack near Ostashkov, and secure a stick from the army group “Center” near the Ostashkovo region. Vrahovyuchi meaning of the blockade of Leningrad, for whatever the price, take the front of the group of armies on the pіvnіch overlooking Lake Ilmen. By order ... it was planned to bury the islands near the Finnish zatots. After receiving the necessary reports, the group of armies takes away the order about further action from the oblogs of Leningrad. It is necessary to prepare for the burying of the deli in the vicinity of Kronstadt.”
From this document, it is clear that on the cob of 1942, having not yet anticipated the bloody winter battles and the great defeat near Moscow, the German supreme command did not put the task of volodinnya and the downfall of Leningrad. Vaughn was formulated by the other half of fate, if the army of E. von Manstein sacked Sevastopol. A part of the її divisions at once from the field marshal will be sent to Leningrad for the residual allocation of a share of the place. Virishennya wuzko tactful zavdan near the district of Lenin-
place a little change of mind for the offensive action against the taxed place. The burying of Kronstadt opposite Kronstadt, as they showed afar, was part of his plan. Until the end of the day, the same orders were planned to replenish part of that army group "Pivnich" with a quantity of 100 thousand. osib. The grouping of the German soldiers under Leningrad was significantly stronger.
At the soldiers of the Volkhiv Front, preparations began for the offensive operation. But the hour was practically not over, it was more, that on the whole stretch of the front, the battles were baked and the battles were conceived. The plans for carrying out the Lyuban offensive operations of the 4th Army of the Volkhov Front were given the task of sharpening and defending the enemy, who hung on the front of Mga to Lake Ladoza. The directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command appointed 1 military depot of the army, in which there were 7 rifle divisions (4th Guards, 191, 44, 65, 377, 92 and 310), 27th, 80th cavalry divisions, 60th tank division, I tank brigade, 119, 120, 128th armored tank battalions, as well as artillery and mortar units of the support. In the course of the defeat of the Tikhvin-Volkhovskoe grouping of the enemy of the 4th Army, General P. A. Iva-
Turgaev A. S., Shpirina N. Yu. Lyuban operation: preparation for the attack
Until the 65th anniversary of the Great Peremoga
New, following the German divisions, which were marching, went to the forefront of preparing the enemy’s defensive positions near Kirishiv.
Here, on a similar birch of the Volkhov river, the German troops created bridgeheads - two strong defensive fortifications near the Kirisha and Gruzino districts. Після відступу під Тихвіном та Волховом командування групи армій «Північ» вирішило утримувати ці плацдарми в надії, що звідси після перегрупування військ та їх поповнення за рахунок резервів знову буде завдано удару з метою з'єднання з фінськими військами на Свірі, захопити комунікації та остаточно вирішити the problem of the capture of Leningrad.
The Kirishsky bridgehead of the Nimtsiv on the shidny birch of the river Volkhov Mav along the front, a valley of 4 km and a depth of
2 km. The 44th division of Colonel P.A. Artyushenko, having crossed to the western bank of the Volkhov to the pivnich from Kirish, together with parts of the 54th army, led an attack on Larioniv Island. The 146th Strile Regiment, under the command of Major M. L. Manzhurin, with a rapt night attack, far away broke through the defenses and crossed the Mga-Kirishi bay. Crossing the road, as the enemy climbed
zdіysnyuvaty zv'yazok іz grupovannyam scho utrimuє Kirishi bridgehead, zmusiv yogo rozpochat counterattacks against radianskih parts.
With a stretch of five debacles, one attack followed another. Ale, the warriors of the 44th division, the local Leningrad militia, invariably threw down the enemy. On March 26, units of the 92nd rifle division, and the 65th colonel P.K. Koshovoy, the 310th general M.M. Zamirovsky and the 4th guard general A.I. Andrey's divisions crossed the Volkhov along the ice along the ice along the railway station of Tigoda and went to zaliznitsi Chudovo-Volkhovbud. Defensive positions of the enemy, like blindly covering the village of Kirishi immediately, attacked units of the 377th rifle division of Colonel K. A. Tsalikov and the 80th cavalry division of Colonel L. A. Slanov. Ale stinks did not reach success. The enemy, for whatever price, having broken the bridgehead on the shidny birch of Volkhov, names him for the configuration of the front “cork of champagne”. Vіn having bolstered the troops that defended there, with parts of the 285th defense and 21st infantry divisions and successfully repelled attacks. Trival began, battles were baked near the Kirishi bridgehead and the territory of the entire Kirishi defense region.
No less bloody things took place near the German bridgehead near Gruziny. Radyansky
The warriors did not go into the matter of repairing the enemy's defensive smog on this division's front. Repeatedly try to throw off the opponent to Volkhov, but they did not lead to anything.
The Kirishsky bridgehead of the enemy on the shidny birch of Volkhov is seriously disturbed by the command of the Volkhov Front. The liquidation of yoga has created a friendly mind for maneuver. The preparation of the Chergovy offensive operation began to liquidate the bridgehead. At the end of the war, the 4th army spent the main human and material resources, which was practically not ready before the planned large-scale offensive.
The rate of the Supreme High Command rozrakhovuval, scho in the course of the wild sichnevoy offensive of 1942. Radyansky troops to occupy Kirish and continue the attack on Tosno. Directive of the commander of the troops of the Volkhov Front No. 004 dated December 21, 1941. the term was introduced for the transition to Kiri-shi to the headquarters of the 4th Army - until the result
December 24, 1941 . However, the units of the 4th army shot down the enemy’s baked opir and could not vikonate the zavdannya, for us in front - liquidated bridgeheads on the right, shidny, birch of the river Volkhov bilya Kirisha and Gruzino. At the other half of the chest, bloody battles flared up behind the bridgeheads, as if they were fighting the great.
cost. All the same, it didn’t take the preparations for the beginning of the Luban offensive operation, it spurred great forces on the accomplishment of a very tactful task, which nevikonannya posed a threat to the whole idea.
Commander of the army group "Pivnich" von Leeb December 26, 1941 having made a note with a worker: “The situation on the right flank of the 1st corps is tense. The enemy is attacking right here near Kirishiv. Viyska suffer greatly in the harsh cold weather. General Beckman, commander of the 11th infantry division, let me know about the full force of the army.
At the directive Stavki at the Central Committee vіd
December 24, 1941 The 4th and 52nd armies were given the task of completing the defeat of the enemy on the shidny birch of Volkhov, seizing bridges and filling up bridgeheads on the western birch, to ensure that the 2nd shock army and the 59th armies were fired.
On the same day, the 4th company of Lieutenant G. Pecherkin from the 60th regiment of the 65th rifle division of the 4th army, following the enemy, crossed the river. Behind her, the 2nd battalion of the 311th rifle regiment of the division and the 2nd battalion was fixed on the western birch.
On the 25th of the day, the advanced units of the 52nd Army captured small bridgeheads for the day and for the frontier near the village of Gruzine, against the forces of Zelentsy, Lizno and Vo-doss. Ale, push yourself forward with a radyansky front
Turgaev A. S., Shpirina N. Yu. Lyuban operation: preparation for the attack
Until the 65th anniversary of the Great Peremoga
part of them did not get away. The enemy, having completed the introduction of the military to a new defensive line, having pulled up reserves and having made strong counterattacks. Moreover, the enemy had zoomed in on bridgeheads on the Volkhov birch in the Kirishiv, Gruzino and Dubtsi regions, which created a threat of flank strikes to the Radianian troops at the course of the future offensive.
The struggle for bridgeheads from both sides was a stretch of the Luban operation, which practically turned off the main forces of the 4th army from victorious battlefield from the breach to Tosno.
The intensity of the battles of the period was also indicated by the German dzherela: “Russians before the front did not get tired of idleness. From the first days we occupied new positions, the stench of the day tried to establish links with parts of the front, which are behind the front line, ”it is written in the memoirs of the 215th infantry division.
The commander of the 380th regiment of the 215th division had a record on the 29th day of his birth: “On this day, the regiment has spent 830 casualties from the moment of an ear of combat operations on the Skhidny front. 30 breast: this year again 11 killed, 37 injured. Among those killed were Ober-Lieutenant Gres-ser, officer candidates Wittel and Blenert. September 4, 1942: today is the first day since the battles at the Skhodі, if I don’t want to
th beaten and wounded. That day, the 4th of September, the Radyansk troops launched attacks along the entire front, in order to save the enemy’s stubbornness and prepare for the attack.
At noon for 31 breasts on vikonannya order of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command about the flooding of bridgeheads on the western birch of the 52nd brigade of the 376th rifle division of the 59th army, which arrived, it was to blame for defeating the miraculous enemy grouping and miraculously taken. So even before the beginning of the main offensive of the Volkhov Front, there were only a few parts of the armies, who entered before the new one, waged uninterrupted offensive battles, consuming people and vitrachayuchi and without that an insignificant reserve of ammunition. After a bitter battle, the regiments of the 376th division crossed the Volkhov. Kіlka year was trivav bіy for the settlement Ribalsky budinochok. Before noon on the 31st of March, the 2nd Battalion of the 1248th Regiment swept up to the village of Pekhovo, but farther on, it didn’t seem to stick out, and it might be all dead. The 3rd Battalion Regiment lost 25 people in the ranks. In the aftermath of bloody battles, small bridgeheads were created in the distance from the forces of Pekhovo and Pertechno. Vitrachy forces, the Siberians of the 376th division continuously attacked the enemy until the 6th day. Less than a day ago, the stench made these attacks on the positions of the fortune tellers, but the enemy didn’t step on the rock, strangling the offensive breeze of the Radyansk troops pushing
artillery and mortar fire.
They tried to get a foothold on the western birch of the river and the battalion of the 267th division of the 59th army. 844th regiment at night on 1 September 1942 having broken through the first line of defense, but until the end of the day, he was forced to break through to the main forces of the division. Spend a lot in the regiment. It became clear to the front command that an hour had been spent. It is impossible to overcome the borders of the enemy on the move, without preparation, without an operational pause, it’s more, as if to introduce a military force, to arrive, right on the march. The Volkhiv Front is ready for the offensive.
In the period of preparation before the offensive operation I. V. Stalin praised the commander of the Volkhov Front List. The new one thought: “To the right, as entrusted to you, to the historical right. The freedom of Leningrad, you yourself understand, is great on the right. I would like to know that the forthcoming offensive of the Volkhov front did not break into trivial matters, but wound into a single, hard blow against the enemy. I have no doubt that you are trying to reverse this attack yourself on a single and fierce blow to the enemy, which throws all the blows of the German zagarbniks. I press my hand and I bless you success. I. Stalin. 12/29/41.
Vantage vіdpovіdalnostі, regulations Betting on the commander
The Volkhov front, having ordered you to take the right decision - do not hurry with the offensive operation, the docks of the war will not be ready before it. The camp was made more comfortable by the fact that the divisions of the Volkhov Front did not have to enter the area of the center for a head strike. The commanders could not detail the defense of the enemy, expand report plans on the other side of the front. The soldiers did not get food and ammunition.
On the 23rd of December 1941, ahead of the advance of the offensive, K. A. Meretskov sent an update to the Chief of the General Staff of the Chervonoy Army, who said: So, for the whole 378 sd there are only 379 twinkles,
3 easel and 15 hand guns,
4 mortars. At 374 rifle divisions, there were 344 screws and 3 mortars for the entire division. 376 RD completed a vivantage with only 8 sets of harnesses for 36 garmats, the division had to make calls and vehicles for the whole day. 372 sd, which completed the vindication, may for the entire division 533 screws, 7 hand guns,
6 mortars, 8 divisional garmats and 12 regimental mortars without a single set of harnesses. Happy holidays
Turgaev A. S., Shpirina N. Yu. Lyuban operation: preparation for the attack
Until the 65th anniversary of the Great Peremoga
zv'yazku division no. Sob don’t waste time on the escaping, virishiv directing the divisions in that camp, like the stench arrives, to the area of the security, so I care that the escort for the division will be filed, and the escaping will be carried out in the area of the security. For washing the enemy’s exit, you don’t call out the great risk, so that the supply of the throw is not hindered. ” The divisions were sent to the front line with practically no-arms defenses, so that the enemy did not launch offensive actions.
Have a rose with a direct dart
A. M. Vasilevsky, Meretskov again broke the chain of food: “Comrade Vasilevsky, give a damn about how well ... I’m going to work day and night, and still I’m in touch with you, that there are daily vehicles, as well as Galaninsk parts ( 59) -I Army of Major General I. V. Galanina. - Auth.) arrived undefeated, had a chance to take them out for an hour of vivantage and on the march. All this dragged out the readiness, and today, Galanin’s zocrema, robbing the robot of about half of the combat kit. And for the tanks, there hasn’t been a light yet.”
On March 6, the commander of the Volkhov Front, General of the Army K. A. Meretskov, signed an order to move to the offensive,
in which it was said: “To the troops of the Volkhov front on September 7, 1942. with all your strength to go over to the enemy attack on the enemy, break through his fortified positions, defeat his living force, revisit imperceptibly the excesses of the broken parts, sharpen and fill them. The order was given directly to the head blow to the front - Siversk-Volosov, as well as the closest task: to break through the enemy’s defenses on the rivers Volkhov, Tigoda, Ravan and go to the front of Lyuban-Dubo-Vik-Cholovo.
At that time, the front did not create a system of bases with food stocks, material resources, ammunition, make a call, not ignite the medical establishment, without forming road maintenance and road service services. The front and the army troops were provided with the necessary number of cars and horse-drawn vehicles.
In such minds, an attack has begun. The soldiers who went on the attack were told that in the next hour they would be brought ammunition, food, automatic riflemen. Before the attack on the Volkhov Front, the Chotiri of the army were prepared, and only one of them - the 2nd shock - the soldiers of the war attached special respect. Significantly why the tragic result of Volkhovsky
The battles were mind-boggling because the armies, for various objective and subjective reasons, set their targets.
The 2nd shock army was commanded by a large intercessor of the people's commissar for internal affairs, General G. G. Sokolov, who did not know the staff and combat robots. Having taken over the 2nd shock army, having begun to see “Suvorovski” punishments: “Walking, like calling the flies of autumn, skasovy and I punish you to walk in the army like this: military crock - arshin, he walks. Accelerations - second, so onslaught.
I don't want to prepare the way. In the middle of the battle, to break that march for snidanok. In the war, the order is as follows: it’s dark, before the sweatshirt, and obid is dark, in the evening. On the day to get bread and crackers and chew on tea - good, but no - thanks for that, since the day is not too long.
Remember to all - to the chiefs, and to the rank-and-file, and to the old, and to the young, that you can’t walk in columns more than a company a day, but go to war for a campaign - nothing, then march.
Don’t be afraid of the cold, don’t dress up as Ryazan women, be a good fellow and don’t give in to the frost. Rub that hands with snow” (mandate No. 14 on 19 leaf fall).
To the line of the front, the battalion of the 2nd shock went pishki, trampling the snow,
reaching the waist. The great fighter of the 2nd shock army P. Gerasimov after 22 years after Peremogi guessed: “We went only at night, in the daytime we hovered at the fox. The path is not easy. To break through the road into the deep snow, it was possible for the colony to be fifteen people each.
The first rows walked, trampling down the snow, reaching the waist in patches. After ten strands, the guiding row entered the kill and attached itself to the tail of the column. Difficult roo was greeted by yet another tim, that unfrozen swampy months and small rivers with ice on the surface froze on the way. It was soaking wet and freezing cold. It was not possible to dry її bulo; The horses were wobbling with the forces. The bedroom ended, and the machines began to chirp. Stock up on ammunition, equipment, food, I had a chance to carry myself. That hungry army was exhausted until the beginning of the battles, practically without equipment and with a small amount of ammunition. Vaughn occupied the last line, schob to go to the rest and decisive battle for the freedom of Leningrad.
Commander of the Volkhov Front K. A. Meretskov, Yak I. V. Stalin, having entrusted the historical right - the siege of Leningrad from the blockade, knowing well the coolness of the Supreme commander-in-chief -
Turgaev A. S., Shpirina N. Yu. Lyuban operation: preparation for the attack
Until the 65th anniversary of the Great Peremoga
nogo, morally buv ready to take the vіn vantage takoї vіdpovіdalnostі. Zvіdsi urgency and inconsistency in yogi deyah at the hour of preparation of the armies before the attack, underestimation of the enemy, decency and inconsistency to make a decision. Tse appointed a lot of commanders at the headquarters on the Volkhov front. The 59th and 52nd armies were given one task at a time, then others. The stench changed the dislocation, the divisions were transferred from one army to the next. This swindler ahead of the operation created nervousness among the commanders, incomprehensibility of what was happening, apathy, if people robbed only those who were punished.
K. A. Meretskov defeated the head blow of the leader by the forces of the 2nd shock and 59th armies, broke through the defenses in the area of Spaskoy Polista, entered the cordon Lyuban-Dubovik-Cholovo and the defense of the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front of the Luban-Chudovskaya grouping adversary. It was planned after defeating the enemy on this distance to advance at the pivnіchno-zahіdny straight line and for the convergence of the forces of the Leningrad Front, break through the blockade of Leningrad.
At the combat report, signed on September 7, 1942. about 00 year. 20 min., Meretskov reminded the Supreme Commander-in-Chief: “Do not be surprised
for those who have not completed the care, the 2nd shock army will move
7 September at the offensive. The main difficulties: the army artillery of the 2nd shock army did not arrive, the guard divisions did not arrive, the air force did not arrive, vehicles did not arrive, stocks of ammunition did not accumulate, the camp with food and sleeping was not corrected.
Preparations before the onset did not go unnoticed by the enemy. Vіn to rob the energy attacks of the positions of the 59th and 4th armies. At the same time, K. A. Meretskov reported to I. To V. Stalin: “Simultaneously with a counterattack on the front of the 59th Army, the enemy and the counterattack are also on the left flank of the 4th Army, wanting a counterattack there, the enemy, having recognized the great losses, but the 65th and 4th Rifle Divisions were thrown into 2 -3 km. Before the current parts of the Chervonoy Army, it was possible to step under the pressure of the enemy. There was no alarm at headquarters Do. A. Meretskova. On the flanks of the forward break, there were great forces of the enemy in the middle, as if they attacked, they managed to lose their positions and mark the end, as the Germans called him, the battle of Volkhiv.
On March 7, 1942, without hesitation in the midst of all divisions, the 4th and 52nd armies of the Volkhiv front crossed over to the offensive. Then they began to sequentially enter into the fighting war that the 59th was arriving
and the 2nd shock army. The offensive was carried out at the straight line of Lyuban and Tosno. For three days the military front tried to break through the fortune-telling defenses, but to no avail. How did it seem, describing in his memoirs the war veteran I. S. Katishkin, who served at the headquarters of the 59th Army: “On March 7, 1942. the troops of our first echelons, after a short artillery preparation, went on the offensive. Under a strong fortune-telling fire, the stench crossed the ice across the Volkhov River, went to the western shore, and buried a few small bridgeheads there. Ale the enemy, pulling up his reserves, striking a number of strong counterattacks and pushing our units back. Having inherited a number of attacks and, of course, counterattacks. Our regiments and battalions either scrambled over the opposite bank of the river, or under the onslaught of fascist tanks and machine gunners, they resurfaced in their positions again. So thrived a sprinkling of days. On September 10, the commander of the 59th army, having added the situation to the headquarters of the front, asked permission from Timchas to launch an attack, give the tired troops the opportunity to put things in order, secure everything necessary for the continuation of the operation. І such a re-repair of buv nadany ".
Commander of the 327th Strile Division of the 2nd Shock Army I. M. An-
tyufєєv guessing: “In the evening of 31 December 1941. the commander of the 2nd shock army, Lieutenant-General G. G. Sokolov, having punished me until the day of the 3rd day, change the units of the 52nd army on the Volkhov birch at the village of the Selishchensky barracks - Gorodok and 6th day we are preparing to attack. Head of the division - break through the defenses of the enemy on the left birch of Volkhov I, obiyshovshi strongholds of the yogo defense, open the Lyuban station, roztashovanu for 80 km from the dilyanka break through. Try to tell me that the division will not be ready to advance to the appointed term, there are no shards of sanitary transport, no more ammunition has been taken away, and more ammunition has been taken across the state, there is no food and fodder, it has not been taken to respect. The general lifted his finger in an ugly way, giving an understanding that the team was going to call and not discuss it. On the Svitanka on the 7th of September, an attack began on all the seas of the Selishchensky barracks - Kolomna (dovzhina
4 km), the 59th army advanced behind us to the right. The future success is not small because of those that the artillery could not support the infantry with its fire. “Artillery preparation was insufficient,” wrote P.P. - We had more than 20 shells for a skin howitzer. Having shot them, we turned out to be helpless and could not help
Turgaev A. S., Shpirina N. Yu. Lyuban operation: preparation for the attack
Until the 65th anniversary of the Great Peremoga
squeeze the fire points of the enemy. The infantry, defenseless before the hurricane fire of the German artillery, which came from the high western coast, fell on the Volkhiv ice with black specks: there were no camouflage coats for the archers.
In the memoirs of the 215th Infantry Division, battles are described emotionally on the cob. Positions in the area of Dimno were recognizable by repeated attacks on the 2nd and 3rd of the day. In the coming days, the stench did not stick. “In the evening of September 7, 1842. the commander of the 6th company of the 380th regiment, sergeant major Shlafen, during the control round, having revealed that a strong Russian zagіn, moving along the snow, silently penetrated between the two posts of machine-gunners and, vikoristovuyuchi chagarnik near Volkhov, evaded. A sumnivny hand-to-hand fight began. I’ll stretch for a few years for a leather fence, a leather ruin booth. The first lower came to help from the regiment, the height of Dimno was again in our hands. The Russians crowded here the elite military - Siberian Komsomol members, well-trained and trained, the number of people who are not full of life ".
Describing the battle that broke out on the eve of the 7th of September along the entire front of the 215th infantry division from Yamno to Dimno, the German authors of memoirs emphasized that hardness, for which the struggle for the skin meter of the coast, for the skin position was sharpened: “Attack,
ended in failure, the Russians repeated opivnochi. The stench made its way to Kolomna and Zvanka. The batallioni fought fiercely for their skins. Hunched in the cold, infantrymen lay at their snow trenches, the gunners stood beating their armies. Year after year passed with a great peace of readiness. Let's sweat it out by shouting "Hurrah!" a new wave of attackers came through the wide Volkhov. MGs (machine guns) threshed the attackers, artillery and mortars fired at them with barrage fire, the attackers kicked. Ale, the commissars raised their cries quietly, that they had lost their lives, they rose again and ran to the western bank of the river. The fire is falling on them again. At different places, they spalahuvav hand-to-hand beating ".
Having crossed the river Volkhov on the borderlands, the military armies recognized great losses in the battles for the coastal settlements, without loosing the zusil for pushing into the mud. Without artillery and tank support, the 2nd shock army for the first year of the offensive was driven in and wounded
3 yew osib.
This is how the Lyubanska offensive operation began. For three days the military front tried to break through the fortune-telling defenses, but to no avail.
praised the decision of Timchas to launch an attack, regroup the army, pull up artillery, bring the necessary material and technical supplies from 13 September to launch offensive battles.
About the failure of the first days of the coming days they knew in Moscow. So, the phone number of Rozmov K. A. Meretskov from Headquarters said: “10 September. At the apparatus Stalin, Vasilevsky.
For all the credit, you do not prepare the attack until the 11th. Yakshcho tse correctly, treba vіdklasti for a day or two. To advance and break through the enemy’s defenses, you need a mother in the skin army to strike a group, I want three divisions and, moreover, to take 5060 harmat near the area of the shock group of the skin army to support the shock group ... As if Sokolov's shock army is not ready, and now you are reaping the fruits of your haste.
Later, the commander of the Volkhov Front, K. A. Meretskov, wrote: Ale about such terms could not be a movie. To that we joyfully choked for the proponed by the Stavka vіdstrochku I will come for two days. For an hour of negotiations, they asked for one more day. cob
the onset, in such a rank, was postponed to the 13th day. At once, the movement began at the command warehouse of the armies. The command of the front was aware that the commander of the 2nd shock army, Lieutenant-General G. G. Sokolov, could not cherish his trusted troops. At the behest of the Headquarters, lieutenant general M. K. Klikov, who at that time commanded the 52nd army. This place was occupied by Lieutenant-General V. F. Yakovlev. The replacement of commanders of a high rank ahead of the next day was not the best signified on the heady course of the operation.
“At midnight on the tenth day of the month,” General M. K. Klikov, guessing about his confession, “they called me to Paporotino, decommissioning the headquarters of the 2 shock army. Meretskov, Zaporozhets, and a representative of the Stavka Mekhlis were already here. Having heard my report about the arrival, Meretskov announced: “Os is your new commander. Plant General Sokolov from the sidelines. General Klikov, take the army and continue the operation.” The order is absolutely unbearable for me. How to continue? Z kim? I asked the chief of artillery from those present:
Shell є?
Ni. Vitracheni, - bula vіdpovіd ".
Turgaev A. S., Shpirina N. Yu. Lyuban operation: preparation for the attack
Until the 65th anniversary of the Great Peremoga
through a skin projectile, until that army had 3 rounds of ammunition. Behind the standard layout, for breaking through the enemy defense, 5 ammunition sets are required and more for
2 ammunition was supposed to be leather, the coming day will come.
The first battles on the Volkhov showed that the troops were not ready before the onset. The military services were not clearly practiced, the daily normal call was made, the headquarters of the divisions and brigades could not quickly assess the situation through the daily reliable information about the police stations and battalions. “The army is already at the battlefield, and the two armies do not have a field hospital,” said A. A. Vishnevsky, chief surgeon of the Volkhov Front.
The German command gave the Volkhov divisional front great significance. So, on September 5, 1942. the commander of the 422nd regiment of the 126th infantry division, Lieutenant Colonel Baron von der Goltz, having voiced at the order: “Pan commander general, having told me yesterday, that we don’t interfere with Volkhov, we program war, we try yoga - we play yoga - we play yoga. Tse varte life ".
At the German dzherelakh, there is a variety of readings about the cob of the Luban offensive operation. So, 3 September 1942. 291st infantry division and battalion
us the regiment of the SS "Dead Head" importantly far away liquidated the break through of the Radyansky troops at the arm of the river Tigoda. In these battles, on the 4th day, the commander of the regiment, Colonel Lomeyer, perished. “But the attack, which was seen at the arm of Tigodi, was not a full-scale attack of the Radian troops. In the first days after the New Rock, the battles of mass significance were fought between Kirishami and Novgorod,” wrote P. Karel.
“The uninterrupted attacks of the Radian troops near the Kirishi bridgehead area were used by privates and officers of the 21st infantry division. The Russians jumped out of the division's parts from positions, to encircle the western bank of the Volkhov. Tsya schodenna struggle made great sacrifices for them. Ale buli spend it from our side, ”it is written in history
21st Infantry Division.
Trying a large-scale celebration of the Volkhiv Front
On September 7, the Germans sprayed like a reconnaissance of the battlefield. “Vorozhnі rozvіduvalnі and percussion corrals z 7 sіchnya thrashed the front”, - naming his robot V. Haupt.
In the description of the combat events of the 4th police division of the SS, battles from 7 to 10 September are not guessed. The stench took on not like a great offensive of the Volkhiv front, which had begun, but like the main frontal essences for a flood
position of the opposing sides. In the history of the 126th infantry division, the battles for the beginning of the day were assessed not as a new offensive, but as a continuation of the Tikhvin operation.
They baked the battles and went at the head of the Tigodi river. “Shvidko formed a battle group from the 505th regiment (291 infantry division) and the battalion of the 9th SS infantry regiment attacked the enemy in bitterly cold weather and thrashed the enemy. Colonel Lomeyer, commander of the battle group, who bore the name "Levi Libavi", having died in every battle," W. Haupt wrote. But at the time of the battles of the Radyansk troops, the enemy was taken by the enemy as a private operation from the expansion of their positions.
Colonel H. Polman also appreciated that the battle began on September 13th. Only on September 15, F. Halder, Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces Nimechchini, made a note to his worker: “On the Volkhov Front, the enemy is being wedged. On the other stretches of the front of the army group "Pivnich" calm.
Analysis of archival documents, guess the participants in the undertakings, the German dzherel allow the growth of visnovkas, which, first, Lyuban offensive operation
1942 bula nepodіvankoy for the enemy. The present day of the Radyansky Viysk Germans checked and up to the new
prepared. “The investigation accurately placed the formation of the enemy’s shock group in front of the front of the 126th and in front of the right wings of the 215th infantry divisions. Bulo installed so that the enemy is ready to attack the bridgeheads of Gruzino and Kirishi, as well as on the pivnіchno-skhіdny front of the army along the side of the Pogostіє”, - it was said in the German documents. There was no need to drink more food, de bude zavdano head blow. Having allowed the headquarters of the army group "Pivnich" to create minimal reserves, it was planned to send the front, zokrema, z-pid of Leningrad to the crisis department.
In another way, it seems obvious that the direct head blow of the Radianian troops to the command of the Volkhov Front was not far off. “I’m still wondering: what was the command for, driving the horses from the impenetrable forests, de no roads, no stitch, and snig the horses in the belly? Adzhe would like to take a look at the topographic map of the Novgorod region, to understand: the city beyond the Volkhov - the right region Mazayu - swamps and marshes, ”wrote a veteran of the 2nd shock army artilleryman I. I. Calabin. Planning to break through the foxes and swamps, the front commander K. A. Meretskov did not lie
Turgaev A. S., Shpirina N. Yu. Lyuban operation: preparation for the attack
Until the 65th anniversary of the Great Peremoga
The Germans have good roads, which can be used to transfer reinforcements and fortify settlements. The enemy was able to maneuver with technology and without interruption to deliver supplies of ammunition and food. The mustache was spared by Meretskov's warrior, driven by the fox in that swamp. In their minds, the soldiers themselves had to carry ammunition and ammunition with them.
Thirdly, the army of the Volkhov Front was prepared for the offensive due to objective and subjective reasons. The divisions did not finish the middle ground on the outposts, they brought in ammunition and food, the aviation was no longer pulled up to the front, the tanks did not get a toe.
Fourthly, signs were given to the volume of war, as if before the cob of the offensive they spent three months in uninterrupted battles. Those divisions and brigades, like they arrived at the front at the warehouse of fresh armies, did not have a small combat record, were not gathered, more soldiers and commanders were more advanced in the forest zone, and that felt very unsettled.
There were more and more reasons on the scale of the Ukrainian country, as if they were objectively poured into the camp of the right at the Red Army, and they appeared on the course of battles near the first river of war. M. S. Khozin wrote about the causes of failures during this period: “One
basic, insanely, bulo sleepy heavy camp, in which our country and Zbroyni Sili sank as a result of the shock that spun us in the summer-autumn campaign. Vorog pіdіyshov to Moscow, having occupied Ukraine, Crimea and Donbas. Viyskove virobnitstvo sharply rushed, there were few tanks and aircraft at the front, no ammunition was available, and there was a firing line of firearms. The important situation daunted us to introduce us into the reserve reserve and that part of the insufficiently trained and beaten ones.
Naprikintsy 1941. The fiery fronts found out the essence of the losses in people who developed that combat equipment. And as the presence of the mobilization of human resources in the country made it possible to rebuild shkoda, to secure the creation of new moldings, then it was not possible to equip the troops that were being folded up to the standard number, and it was not possible to equip parts of the armor and military equipment. Promissory for example
1941 sprouted such a large number of military products, yak added to the army’s military service in the archery division by 30%, in artillery - by 57%, in tanks - by 27%, in combat aircraft - by 55%.
On the cob of the Lyuban offensive operation, the combativeness of the military was renewed again, and a significant amount of fire was rejected
equipping the folded moldings, which were assigned to the strength of the newly created Volkhov Front. Two armies, yakі joined to the yogo warehouse from the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, - the 2nd shock and 59th zagalnovyiskova - did not have a small combat record, the people of that artillery were staffed by 70-90%. Tank parts and artillery parts of the RGK, as well as aircraft stench, were not small. In these armies, the beginning of the operation is not bulo tylovyh parts and installations. Tse was signified on the post in the first days of the coming. At the battle to the soldiers radian army did not get the most necessary - ammunition, ammunition, food. The technical equipment of the German army could be countered by stench with only bagnet and its goodness.
V. V. Gurkin and A. I. Kruglikov, "directives of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command Lenin-
to the city and Volkhov fronts, like, vtіm, and others near the chest
1942, the fate was given without improving the objective assessment of the combat capabilities of the military infantry army and the quality of the reserve formations that are bursting.
The rate of the Supreme High Command with a lack of confidence was set to the ability of the command depot of the Chervonoy Army to carry out combat operations. From Moscow, a drib'yazkova opika was issued for the commanders of the fronts, and in the armies, direct instructions were often given to the commanders of divisions. Such actions shackled the initiative of the commanders, be it corrective according to the plan of operation, if the situation prevailed, it was necessary to agree with the General Staff of the Chervonoy Army, and often especially with I. V. Stalin. Everything in the minds of the battle was marked by a sudden decision, was unfriendly in the wild picture of the offensive operation, which led to tragic consequences.
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Turgaev A. S., Shpirina N. Yu. Lyuban operation: preparation for the attack
Until the 65th anniversary of the Great Peremoga
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About the Lyuban offensive operation, which was carried out by Leningrad in 1941/42, no one can guess. Possibly, to that, to the soldiers of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, another fate of the war was given to vikonaty by setting a task - to open the gates of the ring near the brewery capital. And yet, in 1942, in impenetrable forests and deadly swamps, the stench did not spare itself, robbed of unapplied feats ...
THE SITUATION AT THE FRONT I PLANNED OPERATIONS
Winter 1941/42 R.R. Leningrad is numb in the breams of the blockade. Already in the autumn, pragnuchi for any price to vryatuvat the place, the troops of the Leningrad Front were attacked without interruption. But it was not possible to break through the sharpened blow from the middle - the opponent quickly fortified the line. At the chest part of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts in defensive battles for the places of Volkhov and Tikhvin, they made important threats and went over to the counterattack. The divisions were defeated by the Wehrmacht. As a result, the Germans did not succeed in joining the Finns on the river Svir and closing the “great” blockade around Lake Ladozkoye.
Ladozka kommunikatsiya was left in our hands. Successful events called out hope for the Swedish breakthrough of the blockade of Leningrad from the side of Volkhov. Behind the plan of the Headquarters of the Supreme Headquarters, 4th, 2nd shock and 52nd armies of the Volkhiv front were attacked by a swift blow to expand the German grouping, like a trimalo in the field. Yakby Radyansky Vіyskam far away to go to Siverskoe, Volosov and Luga, then the paths to the entrance for the enemy would be b_drіzan.
The three armies of the Volkhov Front were assigned the main role of the future operation. The 42nd and 55th armies of the Leningrad front were attacked with an active offensive in the middle of the blockade ring, the 8th and 54th armies - from the side of Volkhov, the Primorsk operational group - from the Oranienbaumsky bridgehead.
In times of success, the German 18th army was transformed into a taxable state, it was marked by a catastrophe, the scale of which was the size of the Stalingrad. But Moscow overestimated the possibilities of the fronts. The weather was only announced in the important battles of the summer-autumn of 1941, tradesmanship could not yet give the required amount of fire and ammunition.
The 54th Army of Major General Ivan Ivanovich Fedyuninsky was on the borders of the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts. Commander of the Mav rich fighting dosvid: taking the fate of the conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway, was assigned to Khalkhin Gol. Fedyuninsky highly appreciated G.K. Zhukiv.
For the beginning of the idea, parts of the 54th army were attacked in the area of the Pogost station. Here the enemy crouched down on the sill, which hung over the marshy mistsevistyu. German sappers organized a hard line: in front of the bulge, there were mined fences and rows of prickly dart, at the very nasip, digging trenches, and lined earthen wood in fire specks (DZOTi) and dugouts. The defense spiraled into two vuzli - the Pogost and Shalsky fortified areas. On the side of the MGI, behind the Radyansk positions, there was artillery of an armored train, in the sky there was an active air force.
On the offending sides of the bay - deaf foxes and great swamps. The protégés of the German military took the most important position here. A line of roads approached the main line of defense on the railing canvas, which made it easier to deliver that shift of reserves from one truck to another. At the nearest teel, a sprat of strength stumbled. They took up military service: Suvor had the winter of 1941/1942. skin booths, scho escaping, mav majestic value.
After a stay, Zharok and Shali, the 269th infantry division was reinforced by parts of the 333rd regiment of the 225th infantry division and the battalions of the 96th. The main forces of the divisions of the divizion were overwhelmed by the livoruch, near the area of Pogost - Maluksa. To the right, in the area of Posadnikiv Ostrіv - Kirish, the defense of the 11th infantry division was trimal.
Radyansky viysk perebuvali at the important camp - bіlya, de few buv nі roads, nі settlements. Falcon Moss swamp lay on the column road.
At night, the temperature dropped below -30°C, and the soldiers slept in the snow of the sky, not spitting fire (the fire could be lit by the German koriguvalniks). There was no hot weather on the front line, bread from the fireplaces in the cold. In such minds, a person is balanced on the borders of physical survival, but our soldiers need to attack the enemy.
ON THE COB
Against all the difficulties in breastfeeding, 1941. after a non-tribal preparation, an assault on the German fortifications began.
The first attempt to deceive the fortune-tellers ended in failure. Artillery could not strangle the points of fire on the crest of the pile - giving signs of shell hunger. Rejected ammunition and for effective counter-battery combat. The enemy fired without a carnage at our troops, who entered the outer positions. Pihotintsy didn’t have a chance to hide in the Ulamkiv. Riti's trenches are impossibly: under the snow - the water of an unfrozen swamp. The snow fortification began to be watered with swamp water, turning the snow onto ice.
The Germans froze, the stench was not small enough for a winter coat. That technique did not show off the Germans. In the infants of 1941 and in the middle of 1942. the situation at the Churchyard predicted the positional absence of the hours of the First World War. Kulemets and rows of prickly darts robbed the impregnable German defense.
But the attacks continued. Ignorantly spend money on important things, step by step approached the nasip, and already at the villages on the deaky villages, the radian fury began to creak for 8-10 meters from the German trenches. The opponents threw grenades at one and the other, shot at the back. I realized that without armored vehicles such a situation could not do. The 122nd tank brigade came to the aid of the 54th army (there were three KBs, 11 T-34s and 20 T-40s in the brigade in 1941).
The 1st battalion of Captain Verbitsky was built up immovably from three important tanks and a small number of T-34s. Ale, what stench would you become? So, the crew of the young lieutenant Karyavko, having taken off the "thirty-four" with the number 125, yak turned from the front line. The bashta was pierced in three places, when that machine gun was taken out of harm's way, at the bottom of the car - the bodies of dead tankers ... Ale came without a hitch, and a new crew got the car ready for battle.
Day 17 September 1942 becoming a turning point. At 23:00, the 3rd Guards Division, led by the 122nd Brigade, after fierce hand-to-hand combat, sacked the Pogost station. On September 18, the 11th rifle division broke through the defenses of the gate of judgment, and tanks also supported the battle. The bula division was thrown across the ice of Lake Ladozkoe from Leningrad, the wealthy soldiers and officers at the city lost their families, who died of starvation. The warriors fought without pity for themselves.
Commander of the 11th Division, Major General V.I. Shcherbakov followed the template, nicely zastosuvav elements of underground war. At night, the soldiers of the 26th sapper regiment dug a pit near the pit under the German dugout and laid a pit. After the vibukha, the passerby hid in the husk, and the soldiers of the 163rd, 320th and 219th rifle regiments straightened up. As a result, it was possible to take a boat 2.5 km along the front and 3 km near the ridge.
So the sappers were far away from the vikonati, pass for the tanks - the vranci stench entered the battle. The crew of Koryavko, having attacked the artillery battery, was left-handed and right-handed, as there were bullet points. T-34 knocked down the anti-tank armor, but in front of the fire, the vehicle jammed near the car. In the distance, maneuvering, the tank zmіg plundered three more harmonics, and one rozrahunok - shot from a machine gun. German stump points were covered with caterpillars.
Until the end of the day on September 20, the 11th division practically did not lose anything. 163rd regiment: in the ranks - 60 osib. 320th - 32 individuals. The 122nd brigade spent 11 tanks, and the 1st battalion spent half of its stock. Susіdi front could not take in the divisions of the 11th divіzії, but її soldiers vtrimali zaholenі positions.
BATTLE FOR THE WEATHER AND VINYA HEAD
We were far away from the sounds of our battles, positional battles dragged on for two days. In an hour, the 2nd shock army, on its own division of the front, wedged deep into the order of the guards. It was necessary to promote success. What would not have happened.
Formed a new "fist". Before the assault, the 311th rifle division was prepared: the 1071st regiment attacked the Germans on the left behind the Pogost station, and the 1069th regiment on the right. The infantry was again supported by the 122nd tank brigade, so those that were left behind were two big tanks, a sprat of medium and light ones. At the offensive, the fate of the 281st and 80th rifle divisions also took.
The enemy (333rd regiment of the 225th infantry division) hid behind another line of fortification, as it passed along the privdenniy outskirts of the village of Pogosti and uzliss behind the railing canvas. At a kilometer to the front - 10-12 anti-tank garmats, through the skin 20-50 m - a cullet rozrahunok chi machine gunner. The line was covered with bunkers and dugouts. 10 fierce radyansky infantry and tanks of the kilka once went on the attack, but to no avail. The 122nd brigade spent three tanks.
Shvidsche for everything, the very day of the KV-1 of Senior Lieutenant Smirnov, having entered into combat with a fortune-telling armored train. After the recent attacks of the big tanks, they broke the air of the airfield in bypassing the German fortifications, trying to catch the infantry from the flank. In the course of the battle, Smirnov's tank got stuck in an unfrozen swamp for a few kilometers from Pogost. The crew drove the decks until night to drive the car. With whom, the tank continued to fire.
If the car vibrated from the swamp, a German armored train appeared on the stakes (the canvas was not picked up on this dealership). The tank commander having punished the fire. But there were no shells. The armored train approached unwelcomely, and Smirnov took a battering ram. Water mechanic Dmitro Nekrasov sent KB exactly on the meta. Throwing off a terrible blow from the mist and having slapped the shoulders of the tankers. Ale, the enemy of the tumbledown: a steam locomotive and platforms with harmats flew under the ukis...
Following the data from the German archives in that period, the army group "Pivnich" was supported by three armored trains - No. 6, 26 and 30 German saloon troops. Serving the 18th Army No. 30. Vіn dіyav on the line Tosno - Lyuban - Chudovo. Possibly, the cream of the "numbered", the battles took the fate of other armored vehicles, additional ones. Apparently, the Germans were more willing to win the radian armored fires and freight cars, sheathed with armor sheets. On the dahas, there were hangings from buried tanks BT-7, T-26, T-34. Anti-aircraft guns stood on open platforms. So that the swindlers were not blamed, the improvised armored trains were given sonorous names.
One armored train was on the one-track road Mga - Budogoshch and in the death fire of our infantry in the area of Pogost. In German documents, it is indicated that the birch was born in 1942. one armored train was spent, honed by the Radyansk troops in the Lyuban region. Ale to the zaliznichny canvas near Lyuban, our troops did not even break through. It is possible to talk about an armored train, which was rammed by our tanks.
For three months, the water mechanic Dmitro Nekrasov lay at the hospital. For the feat, zdiisneniya at Pogost, yogi was awarded the Order of the Red Ensign (for example, the military guard of Lieutenant Nekrasov was awarded the title of Hero of the Radyansk Union).
February 12, 1942 after a good artillery preparation, our infantry in cooperation with tanks went on the attack again. The regiments of the 311th division wedged into the German defenses, but were pressed to the ground by heavy fire. Then divisional commander Biyakov, having punished tanks to pull up regimental armies 200-300 meters to the German bunkers.
It really looked like this. T-34 chi KV-1 taking on the garmata, rozrahunok climbing on the armor. Infantry collapsed behind the tank. Having approached the German bunker, or a dugout, the tank fired up the fire, to cover the artillerymen, and the stench at the same time turned the harmata and hit it with direct guidance. On the right, infantrymen were completing, they threw grenades at the enemy through embrasures, doors and smoke trumpets.
The Nimtsiv clearly caught the enemy: the 311th division broke through their defenses and methodically undermined the guards of the bunkers and bunkers in the middle of the Ukrainian region. Dosvid was transferred to the front on the dry land - they began to form assault groups.
However, the success was not far off - the forces of the attackers ended. Obviously, up to eight radyansky divisions and two tank brigades stood behind the documents of one German 296th infantry division. Ale Mayzhe, all the stench changed to a regiment, a battalion, or even a company. So, in the 177th Striletsky Division until 12 February 1942. only 80 bagnets were lost. The soldiers fought in the double pivnichnu part of the village of Pogost, the one-station station that lay down the yard of the dam.
The command replenished the divisions with the remaining reserves. Soldiers from the taillands and Leningraders came to the forefront, who arrived on the Ladozsky ice, they were literally dying from hunger. The 122nd tank brigade of Colonel A.G. Batkivshchyna - 31 KV-1. We were thrown from Leningrad to sweat and fast. Sob 47-ton cars passed through the frozen Ladoga, took the guards, and often dismantled the armor of that possession. The tanks were dragged behind them on special sledges.
Before the attack, two battalions were prepared - 23 KV-1 tanks, 16 armored vehicles BA-10, self-propelled artillery mounts, the 124th motorized rifle-machine gun battalion. It was necessary to build a road to Lyuban - one of the only good quality dirt roads in these parts. And for whom - destroy the Ukrainian region, let Vinyagolovo out and protrude on Kostovo.
Vranci February 16, 1942 after a hard artillery preparation, an offensive began. The head strike was led by the 124th brigade. Farmed in white color the tanks went in two echelons: the 1st battalion of Major N.M. Ribakova, 2nd battalion of Major E.G. Paykina (10 cars). At once they attacked the 3rd and 1029th regiments of the 198th rifle division. They were opposed by parts of the 333rd regiment of Colonel Tim of the 225th infantry division, the "armor" of the 12th tank division and self-propelled garmaty.
The following is the name of Kurt Knispel, who fought at the warehouse of the 12th German tank division, and the most productive ace of the Other Light War (168 tanks). U sichni 1942 p. Knispel was a guide in the crew of Pz.IV non-commissioned officer Rubel from the 29th regiment (Kaufman's combat group). On April 17, the tank was destroyed, and half of the crew was taken out of harm's way.
On the right flank of the lute advance of the Radyansk military buls, 122 tank brigade and units of the 311th rifle division, as if they were guilty, would expand the smog of the breakthrough and secure the main forces against a possible flank attack. Your opponent: 283rd Regiment of the 96th Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht.
Under uninterrupted shelling, the 1st battalion of the 124th tank brigade, at once with infantry, pulled down the nasip and went around the Host from the approach. Such a number of important Radyansk tanks were not checked here, the Germans did not show the vise and flowed into the armor. On the outskirts of the village, the stench wasted hundreds of dead.
The first echelon of the attacking pishov was ahead, the other cleared the city for the day from Pogost. Having defeated the enemy, who had settled near the village, the KB of the 1st battalion took up the fortification of the tilovy camp. Here the infantry tried independently to lower the bunkers and the dugouts, ale bula zupinena with a heavy fire. The tanks easily ran into the fortification and walked through it with their caterpillars.
Having defeated the “fox tabir”, the Radyansk tanks, before the fourth anniversary of the day, went to the road Pogostye - Kostovo - Lyuban and demolished on Vinyagolovo. They were attacked by single tanks from the 12th division. Ale Daremno - three fortune-telling cars were buried. Zagalom, the present grew in full distance. Ale vzimku born in 1941/42 slept early, the marshes did not freeze. Heavy vehicles stalled...
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The enemy, otrimavshi repochinok, organizing an effective defense at his own body. Signifying directly the head blow of the Radyansk troops, the German command pulled up to the Pogost road - Vinyagolovo anti-tank batteries and sapper podrozdili. Knowing that KB armor cannot be taken with 37 mm garmat shells, they started a new tactic. They hurried along, who at the leafy forest looked at the tanks of the surroundings, and the battle distance was short. The fire was fired from 100-150 m, beaten on the side, with caterpillars, guard fixtures and antennas of radio stations. 13 of our tanks took off the damage, but the main part of it did not suffer.
Okrim 37-mm caliber, the Germans zastosuvali in that battle and important systems and ammunition. Behind the bridge across the Moscow State University, a sprat of Radyansky tanks was far away, beating one HF with a vibe, I was watching. On the path of the 124th tank brigade, which was advancing, minis were put in large numbers. The proté was less compelled by the pushing of the Radyansk tanks.
Until 16.30 KB we went to Vinyagolove village. It seemed that victory was near. Ale, the enemy was far away to pull up the reserves and the infantry. At the same time, our tanks were hit by a self-propelled gun from the ambush (for German tribute, one of them, which worked in the Pogost area). Three tanks were hit.
Realizing that without a touch of Vinyagolovo they didn’t hit the tank, the tanks stepped in. Now the front line passed for a few kilometers from the village. About 18.48, a volley of Katyusha was fired at Vinyagolov.
On the right flank, 122 tank brigade and 311 rifle divisions reached the Mga river. The stench couldn't get through. The heavy battle ended. Our troops defeated the Pogostevsky Ukrainian region - they knocked out the main support of the enemy's defense, created a change of mind and a distant offensive.
At the battle of 16 fierce 1942 p. The 124th tank brigade lost (behind the military dzherels) three infantry battalions and a faceless fire point, sank three tanks, an armored car, five garmats, five motorcycles, 1600 min and 1400 hand grenades. Vlasnі vtrati that day: killed - 10 osіb, killed six KV-1 (one fire), not set the mission of chotyrokh tanks, stuck in rivers and funnels five tanks.
After the day, the re-pricking of the war was renewed. The 18th fierce 124th tank brigade, the 198th rifle division and the 6th marine infantry brigade attacked Vinyagolovo again. Ale y in tsikh zhorstok fights (up to 20 fierce) take the settlement did not go far.
Under Vinyagolovo, tanks and infantry supported self-propelled guns SU-T-26 (two of them from the 124th tank brigade were used in battle). Qi combat vehicles - great rіdkіst. They were prepared in the colony near the besieged Leningrad. Base - light T-26. Yogo 45-mm garmat was not suitable for fighting with the floor fortifications, so the Leningrad fakhivtsy urged to install a replacement for the 76-mm regimental garmat under a massive shield. The fire was fortified by two with DP machine guns.
Tim, an hour later, the enemy, pulling up the reserves, fixed himself on a new frontier. It is not safe to advance into the depths of the German defense along the single forest road: on the left flank, over our tank wedge, there is a shal defense vuz. The enemy of the moment be-like mité vidsikti avant-garde against the main forces. At the zv'yazku z tsim command changed directly to the head strike, 124 and 122 tank brigades and rifle divisions were reassigned to the skhid - smash the German defense against Shaloi.
STORM OF SHALSKY FORTIFICATION
February 28, 1942 The Headquarters adjusted the commanders of the 2nd shock and 54th armies. Now the stinks were advancing one by one, one to one, to sharpen the enemy’s loving-wonderful grouping. Kіltse is a little closed in Lyuban. At what hour the offensive operation began to be called Lubanskaya.
Nimtsі also planned otochennya, cutting through the gap of the 2nd shock army near the Myasny Bor area. In the Volkhov forests and swamps, a “smoke” broke out: who was the first to take someone near the ring.
The Wehrmacht maw here is a significant advantage: the divisions took care of the air (the line Mga - Tosno - Lyuban). Everything necessary was delivered to the Radyansk warriors by filthy forest roads. In the spring, in the flood, the postachanny vzagali little pripinitsya ...
For example, the fierce 2nd shock army was left with less than 5 km to Lyuban. Radyansk artillery fired at the station, the front line approached the German headquarters. Two of our tanks and infantry attacked the defenses of the Shal Ukrіprayon. Tanks poked through forest roads and narrow passages. And it dawned again that victory was near...
The 283rd and 284th regiments of the 96th infantry division and the 333rd regiment of the 225th infantry division fought against the Radyansk troops. For effective defense, groups of vinischuvach tanks were formed. At the skin were three soldiers under the command of a non-commissioned officer, fired with anti-tank mines, hand-held and magnetic anti-tank grenades. Ring out, such a group was covered up by bad luck. The German soldiers tried to get close to the tank in order to get the maximum amount of damage. The duel of the Radian tankers and the German vinischuvachs of the tanks was merciless, they didn’t take the captives.
The 37 mm Pak-35/36 Garmat shells were weak for the KV armor. At the birch, 1942 at the defense complex of the 284th regiment of the 96th infantry division of the Wehrmacht, against our tanks, which were advancing on Shalu, they planted a novelty - an over-caliber opera cumulative mine 3.7 cm StieL.Gr.41. Vaughn was installed on the sight of the barrel and was vibrated by an unfriendly charge, could bring out of tune an important tank. The distance of the bula is small - only 300 m, but at the same time the German artillerymen fired from short distances.
Regardless of where the Radyansk tanks collapsed until the road was cut off at the shelter of the Shalsky Ukrіprion, crossing the path to the entrance to the main forces of the enemy. Tsya rozdorіzhzhya took away the name “Zirka Mercedes” from the Germans (behind the shape of the won, she guessed the famous automobile emblem). The most important battles were sharpened here from the 20th to the 23rd of the fierce. The onslaught of our KBs tried to hit the 1st battalion of the 284th regiment with 88-mm anti-aircraft armor, as it pierced the armor of important tanks. Ale, the German battalion suddenly stumbled down at the helpless camp.
From 16 to 25 February 1942 The 124th tank brigade of Radiansk spent 121 soldiers and officers beaten in, 26 were missing. Pidbito 13 KV-1, chotiri tanks appeared. Two self-propelled guns SU-T-26 were on fire, an armored vehicle BA-10 and six vehicles were fired. Ale, the brigade did not spend the fight. Only on March 9, the 1st battalion defeated the regimental headquarters, the bunker of the DZOTiv, defeated six tanks of the 12th division of the enemy, the 2nd battalion defeated the infantry battalion, blasted the bunker, knocked out the tank and fired the battery,
In order to speed up the rozv'azka, the command introduced the 16th tank brigade into the battle (sim KB, 17 BT-7, six T-26, one self-propelled gun). For a few days, the sappers dug in the thick fox prosіku to the fender sill. At noon from 10 to 11 birch, the tanks pulled up a three-meter crossing from the front and demolished her vows at the front. The brigade attacked there, they didn’t check on it. The Germans pulled the main forces to the crossroads area "Zirka Mercedes" (against the 122nd and 124th brigades) and missed the blow of the 16th.
On the 12th day of the scorching battle, Shalsky vuzol fell, the enemy recognized heavy losses. For German tribute, the 1st battalion of the 284th regiment of the 96th division was almost completely reduced, and 29 soldiers were lost in the ranks. Buv was very shabby and the 1st battalion of the 283rd regiment.
The remnants of the broken German parts came through the crossroads of the "Zirka Mercedes", the numerical groups thrashed like foxes, trying to get to their own. In the 1st company of the 1st battalion of the 333rd infantry regiment, only 30 firearms were lost, only 88-mm anti-aircraft guns could shoot at Radyansk tanks, which was saved in the ranks.
Battles for the villages of Dubovik and Lipovik
Having defeated the Nazis under Shaloi, the Radiansk divisions marched to the front of the 2nd shock army. Not looking forward to advancing on Lyuban through Vinyagolovo, our troops broke through Konduya. And here the tanks of the 124th brigade were far away. The stench went into the enemy's teel and cut the road Makr'evska Pustin - Konduya.
Fearing sharpness, the enemy flooded the Konduya and entered the Makariev Pustel. Kam'yanі budіvlі monastery (founded in the middle of the 16th century) was converted by Nіmtsі into a defensive high school. On the 1st and 2nd of April, tanks and infantry unsuccessfully attacked the enemy, which was sitting behind the walls. On April 9, the 124th brigade and the 80th rifle division again went to the assault ...
At this hour, the 107th Army Tank Battalion at once from the 1st Guards Rifle Brigade and the 6th Marine Infantry Brigade rushed to Vinyagolovo. Yishli in the best minds. Having sunk lightly from the snow, the soldiers fell into the krizhan slush up to the waist, and if it was necessary to lie down under the shelling, they were completely wounded. The first brigade zoomed in on the river Mga and closed on the birch. Small paddocks made their way to the German til. Crew N.I. Barishev on the captured tank Pz.III at once from the guard battalion of a few days smashed the soothsayers, after which they went to their own.
The enemy pulled up the reserves and brought the Radian troops to the outer positions. It was not far off to knock out the enemy from the Makarіїvskoi Pusteli. After a few tries, our command pushed back the attack. The 2nd shock army did not reach Lyuban 5 km, the 54th army - 15 km. The Lyuban operation did not reach its goal. The 2nd shock squad spent a lot of people and equipment, and now the 54th army was rattled by itself.
The German military tezh bules were bloodlined and could have taken only a few strongholds. Sutsilnoi line to the front Buv. Near the marshland, a normal trench is impossible to grow, and the soldiers built fortifications from the logs, filling the gaps with earth.
The headquarters of the Supreme High Command again corrected the task: to lead the main blow in a straight line; developing an attack on the villages of Dubovik and Lipovik, against the German troops, who defended themselves on the Kirishi bridgehead. From this bridgehead, the enemy instantly redirected from the river Volkhov to the river Svir, joined with the Finnish troops, having conquered the "Road of Life" and having established the impenetrable "great village" of the blockade of Leningrad.
The 16th tank brigade of Radyansk was advancing from the end of the river. KB forcibly walked along the sour road Zenino - Dubovik. Ale, our tanks, zbivayuchy screening the guards, deliberately poked forward. On the way to the village of Dubovik, they tried to catch the 6th tank company of the 29th regiment of the 12th tank division - six Pz.IV and Sim Pz.III. Zgіdno s nіmetsky documents, in the distance pіdbiti chotiri radyanski tanks. Ale KB still broke through. Before Dubovik, they went, again, for German tribute, 10 radian tanks and that infantry. Started an important battle, the village of kіlka razіv passed from hand to hand. The Germans were able to take Dubovik, but their battalion (the 26th Infantry Regiment) lost only a handful of people.
On the 26th of January, the hero of the 16th Tank Brigade, Lieutenant Oleksandr Martinov, died. Vin was marked on the 8th leaf fall of 1941, if on the steps to the Volkhov road near the area of the village of Zhupkovo, the crew beat the attack of 14 fortune-telling tanks. With the help of Martinov's KB, he knocked down five and zahopiv three German tanks, pulling them out of the battlefield. Captured cars were refarmed and turned on to the warehouse of the tank brigade.
In the battle for Dubovik, the crew of the KV-1 senior lieutenant P.P. Bachilov. The tank broke through on a single road, the villages of Dubovik and Lipovik called the yak. The car had a bad armor, but it didn’t go into the teel, but began to turn along the road, knowing the German wagons. After the battle, the KB, which, having gone straight to the chosen point, ran into a German anti-tank group, it could damage the caterpillar. Tankers in an unruly tank were driven into the enemy, which they had built. Other crews came to help.
The villages of Dubovik and Lipovik didn’t move far away, the Radyansky Viysks had a chance to zupinitsya on this frontier. At the flower-grass, 1942 Striletsky divisions, 16th and 122nd tank brigades repeatedly tried to break through the fortune-telling front. The enemy, understanding the strategic significance of these forces, did not mess up here neither strength nor cost. The village of Dubovik took the 176th regiment of the 61st infantry division, and Lipovik - the 24th regiment of the 21st infantry division. They supported the vehicles of the 29th regiment of the 12th tank division, a large number of okremyh subdivisions. The command of the zmushene was thrown over here to the military from other workers to the front. So, under Lipovik, the 2nd Airborne Regiment, the elite of the German army, leaned down.
May 7, 1942 The German line of defense was broken through by the 16th Tank Brigade, supported by the 32nd Armed Rifle Brigade of the 4th Guards Rifle Corps. For the minds of the spring bottling tankers could know the breeze on the river Chagoda. Ale, the enemy has ruled pasta: the sappers set up on the days of mini and land mines of great tension, it was even easier to see how it was. And yet the Radyansk tanks passed. First forsuvav river KV-1 senior lieutenant P.P. Mitovosyan. Znischiv kіlka garmat ta up to 30 predictive soldiers. The heroes of the heroism of the tankers of the Viysk wedged at the fortune-teller's defense for a few kilometers, and then called Dubovik and Lipovik and never far away.
Prote, the Pogostevsky ledge of the line of the Radyansk-Nimets front, populated the camp of our soldiers. Now, under the threat, the enemy's railroads were transported to the dealership of the MGA - Kirishi. Before that, the Radian divisions "hung" over the Kirishi bridgehead of the enemy, threatening you from the tila.
PIDBAGS OF THE LUBANSK OFFENSIVE OPERATION
Stepping on Lyuban zіthnuv, so i did not succeed. The Germans sharpened the troops of the 2nd shock army, which wedged into their defense, they could sharpen the 54th in the guest "bear".
In the course of battles, for example, a birch tree - on the cob of a day of 1942. Radiansky Viyskaya tried to break through the “neck” into the bear, and the Germans tried to break through the liquid. At the result, it was possible to widen the "neck", having restored the communications of the 2nd shock army, but the camp was still baked. Rejected ammunition, food, medicines and dressing supplies. The situation was exacerbated by the spring impassability. That military council of the Leningrad Front received an order to withdraw the 2nd shock army from the “bear”. On April 20, the commander of the army was recognized as Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov, replacing the seriously ill General Klikov. At the grass-chervnia, the 2nd shock army made its way through the “bear”. Її fighters and commanders appeared in sharpened small disparate groups, and the commander of the army, General Vlasov himself, having had a full meal, and for a year becoming on the way spіvpratsi z nіtlerіvtsy.
The 54th Army, which did not think of joining with the 2nd Shock Army in Lyuban, went over to the defensive. The Lyuban offensive operation is over.
On the whole, this operation is not respected, but the shards of life for these purposes were not defeated: Leningrad was not deblocked, the army group "Pivnich" was not defeated, nor was the minimum task taken in view of the destruction of the Volkhov aggregations on the Germans. It was far less to wedge into the German defenses in the Pogost area and to get a spearhead of bridgeheads on the Volkhov.
Причинами невдачі операції стали помилкове стратегічне планування, недооцінка противника, який, хоч і поступався живою силою, але мав велику перевагу в озброєнні та забезпеченні боєприпасами, невисокий професійний рівень вищої та середньої командної ланки, недоліки в управлінні військами, недостатнє постачання та забезпечення боєприпасами радянських військ . As for the 2nd shock army, the reasons for its death were both weak cooperation with the 54th army, and above-world calls for rates with the order of military extermination.
Up to positive moments, we can see those that the Lyuban offensive operation pulled on the significant forces of the German troops (15 divisions, 6 x from Western Europe), making it easier for them to defend Leningrad. Also, as a result of the operation, it became possible to launch a strike against the Sinyavinsky enemy group (which was destroyed in the fierce 1943).
Planning to break through the blockade of Leningrad in the area of the Sinyavinsky heights, the Radiansk command led the tank brigades to full strength, to prepare them for new battles. The rest of the battles came to the end of 1944, when the enemy was destroyed and thrown out of Leningrad.
For the article D. Bazuev, magazine "Armor".
11.10.2007 22:15
The defeat of the great grouping of the German fascist troops near Moscow and the successful counterattack of the Chervonoy Army near Tikhvin created friendly minds for the task of new strikes against the gates. With the help of the siege of Leningrad in the blockade and the defeat of the lead forces of the Pivnich army group, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command developed a plan for the strategic operation of the Leningrad, Volkhov fronts and the right krill of the Pivnichno-Zakhidny front. The main battles broke out in September-Question 1942 at the Volkhov Front and the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front. Year of the year, the name of the Lyuban offensive operation was given to the city.
Formerly, the plan of the Radian army for the future Luban operation was made by Marshal B. Shaposhnikov at a meeting in I. Stalin on December 12, 1941. The directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on the 17th chest of the Volkhov Front at the warehouses of the 4th, 59th, 2nd shock and 52nd armies was given the order to go over to the deep offensive, looming on the metio of defeating the German troops, who were defending on the western Volkhov, Tarezov head forces of the armies vibiti between st. Luban - Art. Mukachevo. Nadalі advance at the pivnіchno-zahіdnomu directly, otchit the enemy from Leningrad and at the vієmodії z vіyskam of the Leningrad front otchit and polonity, and once you get back to full, - blame yoga. On the same day, by the directive of the Headquarters, the Leningrad Front was assigned: active actions of the 42nd, 55th, 8th, 54th armies and the Primorsky operational group to take the Volkhov Front at the defeat of the enemy, which is defending near Leningrad, the one at the formidable Leningrad bloc .
The main shortcoming of this bov yogo is obvious adventurism. The 59th and 2nd shock armies, as if they were guilty, were less likely to break through the mіtsnu guarding the defense in two tizhnіs, they were in the dorozi to the mіstsya zoseredzhennya. The troops didn't have automatic fire, transport, zasobіv zv'yazku and food. In the artillery for the period of the operation, only three rounds of ammunition per armor were fired. Having brought a special warehouse of elements to the front without preparation, filthy volunteers with a special armor. Deyakі parts and podrozdili were molded from the inhabitants of the steppe regions, as if they were first feathered by the foxes. People were afraid of ruining themselves, fought one to one, strayed the battle formations.
The 54th army, although it overcame all the besieged circles, supported not the Volkhov, but the Leningrad front, which led to superechok and mutual fortune-telling of the commanders of both fronts. The soldiers of the Leningrad Front were greeted by lack of food, warm clothing and were used in defensive battles.
The attack was planned to be carried out for the minds of the panuvannya at the front of the guard aircraft. On top of that, until all the days on the different plots, they turned out to be unsatisfactory for an hour. 16-17 divisions of the 18th army of the German army group "Pivnich" opposed the troops of the 54th army and the Volkhov front, as they created a mitzna of defense near Kirishami and on the left birch of the Volkhva.
On the 7th September of the Volkhov Front, having completed the necessary regrouping and having reached the approach of the 59th and 2nd Shock armies, the echelons of them got stuck in snow marks, crossed over to the offensive and tried to break through the enemy’s defenses on the Volkhov. Viysk 59th and 2nd shock armies were introduced into the battle near the world of their arrival. The offensive did not bring success and the 10th anniversary of the punishment of the Supreme High Command was imposed.
On September 13 of the month of the Volkhiv Front, having created shock groups on the front lines for the breakthrough, they inspired the offensive. The head blow was led by the 2nd Shock Army on Lyuban, from the flanks they supported the 59th and 52nd armies. The offensive was carried out in the folding minds of the leafy-marshy forest, in the minds of the roadless, in the deep snow. The troops were freed up for maneuver, the delivery was made more difficult. The enemy has repaired the opir. Only on a direct head blow and on the left flank of the 59th Army, after the invading battles, it was possible to break through the enemy’s defenses on the day before the 25th day of the Spaska Polist. At the breaks, the 13th cavalry corps was ordered. The attack of the 2nd Shock Army, developing the offensive, to the end of the day, in a narrow wedge, slipped up to 70-75 km and deeply swarmed from the pivden approach of the Lyubansko-Chudovsk enemy grouping. To help the Volkhov Front in the final stage of sharpening, for example, a fierce attack, the 2nd Shock Army in a direct attack on Lyuban was led by the 54th Army. Knowing the heavy losses, the її viysk before the end of the birch slipped 22 km and went on the steps to Lyuban from the pіvnіchny descent. However, it was not possible for the Radyansky warriors to advance the offensive and complete the sharpening of the enemy.
Near the northern birch, the German command pulled up the 18th army to a swarm of reserves, 11 divisions and one brigade. To support their troops near the area, I’ll break through the enemy to glue up to 250 bombers in the 1st counter fleet. It drastically changed the spivvіdnoshennia of forces on the Lyuban direct. In the middle of the day, the enemy began to inflict counterattacks with the flanks of the 2nd Shock Army. On the 19th of March, having stood in the middle of the flanks of another Shock Army, the new forces, the German troops were able to fight back against the front.
On March 27, at the cost of great losses, the troops of the 52nd and 59th armies pierced a 3-5 km neck, which brought the 2nd Shock Army to the front, the army’s protest camp was left foldable. It became even more important with the cob of spring roadlessness, if roads and columns of roads were laid, laid through the marshy lands of the forest and forest massifs. The posts were broken, the bells and whistles were sent to the officers of the troops. The operation was practically a failure, but the Headquarters, not looking at the real situation, continued to push forward on the advance.
On April 30, the attack near the Lyuban region was pinned down. Tim is no less, the 2nd Shock Army until the summer waged important defensive battles, easing the clogs of the ledge, and only for example the grass took away the order of rozpochati vіdkhіd. That same year, a new chief commander was recognized - Lieutenant-General A.A. Vlasov, who was appointed in battles under Moscow, and in 1941, roci dvіchi from battles came out of sharpening.
A week later, after the recognition of the new commander of the army, the army again settled in the kilts. The Viysk Rada of the Army adopted a decision in the night from 24 to 25 worms to break through with all the forces that were left out, sharpened. The command of the front announced the leader of the strike, directing the tanks to break through. Tse splkuvannya was vikonano.
24 worms of the army of the army, which in the main formations went to the ravine, in the area of the village of Myasniy Bor, recognized a poor cross-fire from the first sight of the fire. Vryatuvatis far away nebagat.
The guards of the 25th chervnya of the Germans closed the hoop residually. Virvatis s otochennya tієї nights and other groups in the coming days could, for various tributes, from 6 to 16 thousand people. They perished and appeared without news for an hour, breaking through from 14 to 20 thousand people. General Vlasov himself leaned against the Germans.
Jerela:
1. Lubchenko Yu., "100 great battles of the Other World", Viche, 2005
2. Dzeniskevich A.R., Kovalchuk V.M., Sobolev G.L., Tsamutali O.M., Shishkin V.A., "Neskoreny Leningrad", Science, 1970
3. "History of the Great Vitchiznian War of the Radyansk Union, 1941-1945", 1963
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